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1. Introduction 
One of the most significant developments in the online environment over the last 
few years has been the rise of social media.1 More and more individuals are making use of 
Online Social Networks (OSNs) to stay in touch with family and friends, to engage in 
professional networking or to connect around shared interests and ideas. But users are not 
the only ones who are interested in OSNs. OSNs have come to attract a wide range of actors, 
which include application developers, web trackers, third-party websites, data brokers and 
other observers.  
As the number of actors engaging with OSNs and OSN data increases, so does the 
risk for potential privacy infringements. One way to minimize this risk is to clearly define 
the rights and obligations of each actor. The objective of this deliverable is to analyze how 
the current data protection framework relates to the context of OSNs. To this end, we will 
begin by describing the various actors engaging with OSNs and the interactions between 
them. Next, we will identify the legal status of each of the actors in order to map their rights 
and obligations. This deliverable serves as a building block for a number of forthcoming 
SPION deliverables, namely (a) Liability and accountability of actors involved in online 
social networking services (SPION D6.3); (b) Evaluation of the applicable legal framework 
(SPION D9.6.3) and (c) Policy recommendations for privacy-friendly social networks 
(D9.6.6).  
 
 
  
                                                 
1 O. Tene, ‘Privacy: the new generations’, International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 22. 
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2. “Who’s who?” Mapping the relevant actors  
The purpose of this section is to identify the main actors engaging with OSNs. Our 
inventory is based on a literature study of news articles, academic publications and 
regulatory guidance concerning security and privacy in OSNs. A common denominator 
among the selected entities is that they each process personal data resulting from (a) the 
usage of OSNs and/or the usage of other services which somehow interact with the OSN. 
 
The following figure provides a -highly simplified- representation of the main actors 
engaging with OSNs and OSN-related data. It is intended to be conceptual rather than 
factual.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Relevant OSN Actors 
    
The arrows in Figure 1 indicate that an exchange of personal data is taking place. 
This exchange can be either uni- or bi-directional. Solid black arrows signify exchanges of 
personal data which occur primarily ‘in the foreground’, meaning that they can easily be 
observed or inferred by users. They typically imply some form of active involvement by 
users (e.g., granting a permission, manually entering data, use of an application). 
Dashed grey arrows were used to signify data exchanges which are likely to be less 
obvious to OSN Users. Some of these exchanges may be detectable (e.g., by monitoring the 
activities of one’s internet browser) or otherwise ascertainable (e.g., by reading the privacy 
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notice of an OSN provider).2 Others may occur completely unnoticed. Over the following 
sections, we will briefly describe each of the actors and interactions displayed in Figure 1.  
Note that the categories of actors identified in Figure 1 are not mutually exclusive. A 
given actor may combine multiple roles depending on the circumstances (e.g., an OSN 
provider might also deploy its own tracking mechanisms, or an application provider might 
also be the operator of a third-party website).  
 
2.1 OSN user 
People join OSNs for a variety of reasons. Most people do so to stay in touch with 
friends and family, to connect around shared interests or hobbies, or to make new friends.3 
Increasingly, however, OSNs are also used by companies and other organizations to 
advance commercial, political or humanitarian goals.4  
The creation of an OSN account (or ‘profile’) involves disclosure of a number of 
attributes, which typically include name, date of birth and place of residence. Most OSNs 
also encourage its users to upload a picture of themselves.5 Depending on the nature of the 
OSN, users might be encouraged to reveal additional information such as relationship 
status and interests (e.g., Facebook) or current employment (e.g., LinkedIn).  
Once a user has signed up, he or she is essentially free to share any information they 
see fit. This information can range from mundane facts (e.g., “I’m at the mall”), to political 
views (e.g., “vote ‘no’ on prop 11”), to highly intimate personal details (e.g., “I’m dating Alice 
but I think I’m in love with Bob”). Even though the policies of an OSN may impose certain 
restrictions, OSN users are also in a position to disclose information about others.  
It is worth noting that a significant amount of personal data disclosed via OSNs is 
relational. Social connections among OSN users can be used to create a ‘social graph’, 
whereby nodes represent users and connections or edges represent the relationships 
                                                 
2 Even if users are notified of their existence at a certain point in time, they may not be consciously aware of 
them at a later stage, as these exchanges typically occur ‘in the background’ or do not require active User 
involvement.  
3 A. Smith, ‘Why Americans use social media’, Pew Internet & American Life project, 15 November 2011, 
available at  http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Why-Americans-Use-Social-Media.aspx (last accessed 17 
December 2013). 
4 See e.g.  J. Heidemann, M. Klier and F. Probst, ‘Online social networks: A survey of a global phenomenon’, 
Computer Networks 2012, vol. 56, p. 3871-3872 (discussing potential usage by businesses); R.D. Waters, E. 
Burnett, A. Lamm and J. Lucas, ‘Engaging stakeholders through social networking: How nonprofit 
organizations are using Facebook’, Public Relations Review 2009, Vol. 35, Issue 2, p. 102–106.   See also Article 
29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, WP163, p. 7, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf (last accessed 17 December 
2013). 
5 d.m. boyd and N.B. Ellison, ‘Social Networking Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship’, Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication 2008, vol. 13, p. 211-212. 
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between these users.6 In addition, many OSN features have been designed to expose 
additional relational information (e.g., by promoting group formation).  
At the end of the day, OSN users disclose considerable amounts of information about 
themselves. They also access significant amounts of information related to others. This flow 
of personal data is depicted in Figure 1 as bi-directional arrow (1).  
 
2.2 OSN Provider 
The central actor in Figure 1 is the OSN Provider. An OSN provider is an entity that 
operates the hard- and software necessary to deliver an OSN service.7 According to boyd 
and Ellison, the key features of social network sites are that they allow individuals to 
‘(1)construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system,  
(2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and  
(3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the 
system.’8 
While the display of profiles showing a list of connections may be considered the 
‘backbone’9 of an OSN, many platforms offer an array of additional features and services. 
OSNs typically provide common messaging services (e.g., chat, email), as well as message 
board and commenting functions.10 Other features encourage users to import information 
from outside the OSN domain, e.g. through ‘share’ or ‘like’ functions (see also infra; section 
2.6). 
OSN providers also operate the hard- and software which enables them to generate 
revenue from their service. For most OSN providers, the primary source of revenue is 
                                                 
6 R. Sayaf and D. Clarke, ‘Access control models for online social networks’, in Social Network Engineering for 
Secure Web Data and Services, IGI, 2013, p. 2.; G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. Vakali 
and L.C. Jain (eds.), ‘Online Social Networks: Status and Trends’, New Directions in Web Data Management, 
Studies in Computational Intelligence, Vol. 331, 2011, p. 215. 
7 A reference architecture of OSNs can be found in G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. 
Vakali and L.C. Jain (eds.), ‘Online Social Networks: Status and Trends’, New Directions in Web Data 
Management, Studies in Computational Intelligence, Vol. 331, 2011, at p. 217. 
8 d.m. boyd and N.B. Ellison, ‘Social Networking Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship’, l.c., p. 211. This 
definition has been criticized by Beer as being too broad: see D. Beer, ‘Social network(ing) sites … revisiting 
the story so far: A response to danah boyd & Nicole Ellison’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 
2008, Vol. 13, p. 516 et seq. See also J. Heidemann, M. Klier and F. Probst, ‘Online social networks: A survey of 
a global phenomenon’, l.c., p. 3867. Like Heidemann, we use the term Online Social Networks to refer to ‘user-
oriented’ (as opposed to ‘content-oriented’) social network sites; which emphasize social relationships and 
communities. The distinction between ‘content-oriented’ and ‘user-oriented’ social networks was proferred 
by G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. Vakali and L.C. Jain (eds.), ‘Online Social Networks: 
Status and Trends’, l.c., 2011, p. 220. 
9 d.m. boyd and N.B. Ellison, ‘Social Networking Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship’, l.c., p. 211. 
10 J. Heidemann, M. Klier and F. Probst, ‘Online social networks: A survey of a global phenomenon’, l.c., p. 
3867. 
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derived from advertising.11 These business models are based on the principle that ‘free’ 
services can attract large and diverse audiences, which in turn will attract advertisers.12 
Popular OSNs, which have a large number of active users, can develop rich sets of 
demographic and behavioral data.13 The profile information of these users, together with 
information about their activities (e.g., web browsing, app usage, ‘likes’, current location, 
etc.), can be used to enhance audience segmentation and contextual awareness.14 This 
ability is of great interest to advertisers, who are eager to see advertisements presented to 
users who are likely to be influenced by them. The data flows which facilitate behavioral 
targeting are represented in Figure 1 by arrows (4) through (10). Each of these data flows 
will be elaborated further over the following sections.  
 
2.3 (Third-party) Application provider 
Third-party applications (often referred to simply as ‘apps’) have become a popular 
feature on OSNs.15 An app is a standardized piece of software that runs on a computing 
platform.16 In principle, an app can provide just about any functionality: gaming, content 
                                                 
11 For an early analysis of different revenue models for OSN see A. Enders, H. Hungenberg, ‘The long tail of 
social networking. Revenue models of social networking sites’, European Management Journal 2008, Vol. 26, 
p. 199– 211. For a more recent study see G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. Vakali and L.C. 
Jain (eds.), ‘Online Social Networks: Status and Trends’, l.c., 2011, pp 213-234. Alternative and/or additional 
revenue sources include subscription fees (e.g., for ‘premium’ accounts) and platform purchases (e.g., by 
charging a percentage on the purchase of apps or other products which were bought through the OSN 
platform). 
12 G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. Vakali and L.C. Jain (eds.), ‘Online Social Networks: 
Status and Trends’, l.c., p. 221. 
13  Ibid, p. 222. 
14 Facebook, for example, enables third parties to target advertisements to its users on the basis of location, 
gender, age, likes and interests, relationship status, workplace and education (see 
https://www.facebook.com/help/207847739273775). (See also R. Heyman and J. Pierson, ‘An Explorative 
Mapping of the Belgian Social Media Value Network and its Usage of Personal Identifiable Information’,  paper 
presented at IFIP Summerschool on Privacy & Identity Management 2013, p.2.) In April of 2013, Facebook 
added ‘partner categories’ as an additional targeting feature, which enables advertisers to target individuals 
based on the basis of their purchase behavior outside the social network.  See https://www.facebook-
studio.com/news/item/partner-categories-a-new-self-serve-targeting-feature (last accessed 17 December 
2013).  For a survey of different targeting methods using social networking information see A. Bagherjeiran, 
R.P. Bhatt, R. Parekh and V. Chaoji, ‘Online Advertising in Social Networks’, in B. Furht (ed), Handbook of 
Social Network Technologies and Applications,  2010, Springer, New York, p. 653 et seq. 
15 M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, ‘AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social Apps’, 
Proceedings of ACM Conference on Online Social Networks (CSON) 2013, preprint version available at 
http://www.sba-research.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/AppInspect_peprint.pdf  
16 OECD, ‘The App Economy’, OECD Digital Economy Papers 2013, No. 230, OECD Publishing, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3ttftlv95k-en (last accessed 19 December 2013). Apps can be divided among 
two main categories: ‘mobile’ or ‘web-based’. In case of mobile apps, the ‘computing platform’ that hosts the 
app is a mobile device, typically a smartphone or a tablet. In case of web-based apps, the app itself is hosted 
on a webserver which is controlled by the application provider. While mobile apps are stored on a 
smartphone rather than a webserver, many mobile apps still communicate with a webserver. For purposes of 
simplicity, we will approach our discussion of third-party applications under the assumption that they are 
web-based, except when explicitly indicated otherwise. For an in-depth discussion of mobile apps on smart 
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streaming, location sharing, crowd funding … the possibilities are endless. Several major 
OSN providers now allow third-party application developers to offer their apps through the 
OSN.17 This in turn permits users to enhance their OSN experience with additional 
functions and features.  
Some apps are ‘socially aware’, meaning that they consume OSN data (e.g., profile 
data, relationship information) to deliver their functionality. For example, a horoscope 
application might require the birthdates of you and your contacts in order to create a 
compatibility chart. Other apps do not require user data to function as such, but use them 
to incorporate other aspects of social networking.18 For example, users might be 
encouraged to share gaming high scores or to display which music feeds they are listening 
to on their profile. The data collected by apps may also be used to facilitate behavioral 
targeting (cf. infra). 
While an app may be accessible through an OSN website, the app itself typically runs 
on a third-party server (i.e., outside the OSN domain).19 In order to make app usage an 
integral part of the user experience, the OSN provider can embed applications within the 
OSN website (e.g., as an iframe).20 In this approach, the OSN provider effectively acts as a 
proxy between OSN users and third-party application providers.21 Alternatively, the OSN 
provider can simply direct its users to the websites of the application providers.  
App usage is generally predicated upon the granting of permissions. Most 
applications stipulate a number of permissions which must be granted before the app can 
be used. Such permissions typically concern access rights (e.g., the ability to access to 
profile information, photo’s, etc.) and/or the ability to act on the user’s behalf (e.g., to post 
on a message board or send an email on behalf of the user).22   
                                                                                                                                                             
devices see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, WP202, 
27 February 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2014). 
17 W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, ‘Security and Privacy of Online Social Network 
Applications’, in L. Caviglione, M. Coccoli and A. Merlo (eds.), Social Network Engineering for Secure Web Data 
and Services, IGI Global, 2013, p. 207 et seq. 
18 M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, ‘AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social Apps’, 
l.c., p. 2. 
19 Id. In earlier implementation models, social applications were deployed on the infrastructure of the OSN 
itself (this model is sometimes referred to as the ‘gadget paradigm’). Increasingly, however, a different model 
is followed, whereby applications are delivered through an Applications Programming Interface (API) (also 
referred to as the ‘distributed’ paradigm). (W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, ‘Security and 
Privacy of Online Social Network Applications’, l.c., p. 208.) 
20 M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, ‘AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social Apps’, 
l.c., p. 2. See also W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, ‘Security and Privacy of Online Social 
Network Applications’, l.c., p. 211 et seq. 
21 Ibid, p. 1. 
22 In practice, the OSN user delegates one or more access rights to the application provider using a pre-
determined protocol (e.g., OAuth). Once the permissions have been granted, the application provider will 
query the social network application programming interface (API) to make use the delegated privileges (e.g., 
access profile information, post to wall). (W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, ‘Security and 
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Once permissions have been granted, the application provider can use these 
privileges to collect personal data from the OSN provider. It can also collect additional 
information from users directly (e.g., by monitoring application usage). These data flows 
are depicted in Figure 1 as arrows (2) and (3). Arrow (2) is bi-directional because 
application providers may also send their users data about other users (e.g., music feeds or 
current location). 
 
2.4 (Third-party) Tracker 
Web tracking is pervasive. It has become practically impossible to navigate the web 
without multiple entities keeping tabs on which sites we visit, which pages we view or how 
much time you spend on a particular page. In the context of this deliverable, we use the 
term ‘tracker’ to refer to any entity that collects and/or analyzes data relating to the 
browsing activities of OSN users.23  
There are many different ways of tracking individuals online.24 The most well-
known technique involves the use of ‘cookies’.25 Cookies are browser files deployed by 
website operators in order to keep track of their interactions with a particular visitor.26 
Very often, individuals also receive cookies emanating from third party domains (‘third-
party cookies’), which can be used to monitor their browsing behavior across different 
websites.27 Other well-known tracking techniques involve use of javascripts and browser 
fingerprinting.28  
By monitoring individuals’ browsing activities over time, trackers are able to build 
rich behavioral profiles. These profiles can in turn be used for online behavioral advertising 
                                                                                                                                                             
Privacy of Online Social Network Applications’, l.c., p. 208). See also M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, 
E.R. Weippl, ‘AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social Apps’, l.c., p. 1-2. 
23 We have bracketed the term ‘third party’ to indicate that several OSN provider deploy their own tracking 
technologies to monitor user behavior inside and outside the OSN. 
24 See C. Casteluccia, ‘Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical perspective’, S. Gutwirth et al. (eds.), 
European Data Protection: In Good Health?, 2013, Springer Science+Business Media, p. 21 et seq. for an 
inventory of prevalent web tracking techniques.  
25 A cookie is an alphanumeric text file which is stored by a web browser. Cookies are typically set by web 
servers the first time a user visits a particular site. They are then sent back automatically by the browser each 
time it accesses the web server that placed them.  (C. Casteluccia,‘Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A 
Technical perspective’, l.c., p. 23-24 and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online 
behavioural advertising’, WP 171, 22 June 2010, p. 7, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf (last accessed 3 January 
2013).  
26 This technique may be particular useful for identifying returning visitors and recording user preferences 
(e.g. language preferences).  
27 For example, a web page may contain images, links, iframes or other components stored servers in other 
domains. When the user accesses the website, these components will be retrieved from the third-party 
domain, which allows for the placement of third-party cookies. This technique can be used to effectively track 
users across multiple sites (in particular across all pages where one has placed an advertising image or web 
bug) (C. Casteluccia,‘Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical perspective’, l.c., p. 23-24.) 
28 See C. Casteluccia,‘Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical perspective’, l.c., p. 21 et seq. 
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(OBA), which is an important source of revenue for trackers.29 In many cases, third-party 
trackers work on behalf of an ad network, whose goal it is to target ads with the maximum 
effect possible.30  
A 2008 study by Krishnamurthy and Wills showed that individuals’ activities on 
OSN may be subject to third-party tracking. Specifically, they found that several user 
actions (e.g. logging in, viewing a profile page, leaving a message) on OSNs such as 
Facebook and Myspace resulted in the retrieval of objects from third-party domains.31 The 
access of third-party domains in this context suggests that OSN users may be tracked by 
third parties even when they are engaged in social networking activities (in addition to 
being tracked during other browsing activities).32 In a follow-up study, the same authors 
found that many OSNs also leak additional information about OSN users, such as name, 
gender or OSN unique ID.33 This means that the browsing behavior of a particular OSN user 
– including his or her behavior outside of the OSN context - may be easily linked to his or 
her OSN identity.34   
The data flows related to tracking of OSN users are depicted in Figure 1 by arrows 
(4) and (5). Arrow (4) represents tracking which occurs via the browsers of OSN users 
(arrow (4)). In this scenario, the OSN provider does not directly share information about 
the user with trackers. Instead, it is sufficient for the OSN provider to embed components 
                                                 
29 The Article 29 Working Party defines behavioural advertising as advertising which is based on the 
observation of the behavior of individuals over time. By studying the characteristics of individuals’ behavior 
over time (repeated site visits, interactions, keywords, etc), trackers can develop specific profiles on 
individuals, which in turn allows tailoring advertisements to the inferred interests of each individual 
concerned. (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising’, 
l.c., p. 4). 
30 An ad network is an entity that connects website owners (‘publishers’) with advertisers. In this model, a 
website owner simply needs to reserve a certain amount of visual on its website that will serve to display ads 
and relinquish the rest of the process to one or more ad network providers. The ad network provider is then 
responsible for distributing advertisements to publishers (on behalf of companies seeking to advertise). 
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising’, l.c., p. 5.) As 
indicated earlier, many OSN providers offer targeting options which function independently of third-party 
trackers, using criteria derived from e.g. the profile information of their users. In this model, the OSN provider 
uses its own targeting technology and makes its own decisions about ad placement and distribution (in 
accordance with advertiser demands). 
31 B. Krishnamurthy and C.E. Wills, ‘Characterizing Privacy in Online Social Networks’, WOSN 2008, 
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Online social networks, 2008 p. 40. 
32 Ibid, p. 41. 
33 B. Krishnamurthy and C.E. Wills, ‘On the Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information Via Online Social 
Networks’, WOSN 2009, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Online social networks, 2009, p. 7. See also 
C. Casteluccia, ‘Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical perspective’, l.c., p. 28. 
34 Id. See also J. Cheng, ‘Social networks make it easy for third parties to identify you’, Ars Technica, 25 
September 2009, available at http://arstechnica.com/security/2009/09/which-user-clicked-on-viagra-ads-
ask-myspace-and-facebook (last accessed 7 January 2013).  
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which result in the retrieval of third-party objects.35 As indicated above, however, this 
retrieval may also involve leakage of additional information from the OSN. 
Arrow (5) depicts the data flows which take place in situations where an OSN 
provider actively collaborates with a tracker. This might occur, for example, in situations 
where the tracker is working on behalf of the OSN provider (e.g., if the OSN provider wishes 
to collect data about its users browsing activities).36  
It is worth noting that application providers and third-party websites similarly 
embed components which facilitate third-party tracking and ad delivery. This is depicted in 
Figure 1 by arrows (6) and (8).37 
Finally, we would like to mention that tracking of OSN users is not limited to their 
browsing activities. With the rise of mobile OSNs (e.g., Foursquare) and mobile apps more 
generally, location tracking is increasingly used supplement the behavioral profiles of OSN 
users.38 
 
2.5 (Third-party) Data broker 
Data brokers (also referred to as ‘data aggregators’ or ‘information resellers’) are 
entities which collect and sell information. To be more specific, a data broker is a company 
that collects data, including personal data, from a wide variety of sources with a view of 
turning these data into marketable commodities.39 Among the products offered by data 
brokers are consumer profiles (which categorize individuals into pre-determined 
consumer segments) and scoring products (which score the likelihood for certain 
behaviors, based on inferences drawn from other data).40 
Several data brokers also collect data about individuals from OSN sites.41 For 
example, data broker Acxiom reportedly collects data regarding individuals’ social media 
                                                 
35 Arrow (4) is bi-directional arrow because every time a user accesses a webpage which links to the tracker’s 
server, the cookie that is stored in the user’s browser will be updated with data about the user’s latest 
interactions. 
36 We have bracketed the term ‘third party’ to indicate that several OSN provider deploy their own tracking 
technologies to monitor user behavior inside and outside the OSN. 
37 Arrows (7) and (9) are misleading to the extent that tracking occurs via the browser or operating system of 
the user (in which case they would simply coincide with arrow (4). We deliberately chose this way of visual 
representation to make clear that users can be tracked across a wide range of activities, i.e., across web 
browsing, OSN usage and app usage. 
38 See C. Casteluccia, ‘Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical perspective’, l.c., p. 29. 
39 Based on Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, March 2012, 
p. 68, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-
report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
40 U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, ‘A Review of the Data Broker Industry: 
Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes’, Staff Report for Chairman Rockefeller, 
2013, p. 12 and 23 available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-
6221-4888-a631-08f2f255b577 (last accessed 6 January 2014).  
41 Other avenues include government records and other public data, purchase or license from other data 
collectors, cooperative agreements with other companies, self-reporting by consumers (e.g., through surveys 
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usage to predict whether he or she should be considered a ‘heavy social media user’, 
‘poster’, ‘video sharer’, ‘social influencer’, or ‘social influenced’.42. Several data brokers 
reportedly also use click-stream data (i.e. data relating to individuals’ browsing behavior) 
in developing consumer profiles.43  
Information collected by data brokers is put to a variety of uses. Prominent 
examples include identity verification, fraud prevention, marketing, credit risk assessments 
and background checks.44 Some data brokers also offer products that enable marketers to 
use off-line data to target individuals online.45 These products can also be put to use in an 
OSN context. Facebook, for example, has partnered with data brokers such as Acxiom, 
Datalogix and Epsilon so that advertisers can target OSN users on the basis of their 
purchasing behavior outside the social network.46 Facebook has reportedly also partnered 
with data broker BlueKai to enable further targeting of OSN users on the basis of their 
browsing activities outside the OSN.47 
Figure 1 visualizes the corresponding data flows as follows: arrow (9) represents 
the exchange of personal data that takes place between data brokers and social networks. It 
is important to note that the collection of personal data by data brokers does not 
necessarily involve ‘active’ disclosure by the OSN provider (e.g., the data might simply be 
collected from publicly available OSN sites). Arrow (9) is bi-directional as data brokers may 
also indirectly reveal data about OSN users to the OSN provider (e.g., regarding their 
inferred interests).48  
                                                                                                                                                             
or questionnaires). U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, ‘A Review of the Data 
Broker Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes’, l.c., p. 15. 
42 Ibid, p. 21. 
43 Id. See also OECD, "Exploring data-driven innovation as a new source of growth: Mapping the policy issues 
raised by "big data"", in OECD, Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innovation, 2013, 
OECD Publishing, doi: 10.1787/9789264193307-12-en, p. 328, available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org. 
44 Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, March 2012, l.c., p. 68 
45 U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, ‘A Review of the Data Broker Industry: 
Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes’, l.c., p. 12. 
46 Specifically, Facebook has added ‘partner categories’ as an additional targeting feature, which enables 
advertisers to target individuals based on the basis of their purchase behavior outside the social network.  
See https://www.facebook-studio.com/news/item/partner-categories-a-new-self-serve-targeting-feature 
(last accessed 17 December 2013). See also C. Dello, ‘Facebook to Partner With Acxiom, Epsilon to Match 
Store Purchases with User Profiles – Can Facebook Ads Drive Offline Buying?’, Advertising Age, 22 February 
2013, available at http://adage.com/article/digital/facebook-partner-acxiom-epsilon-match-store-
purchases-user-profiles/239967 (last accessed 7 January 2014).   
47 K. Opshal and R. Reitman, ‘The Disconcerting Details: How Facebook Teams Up With Data Brokers to Show 
You Targeted Ads’, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 22 April 2013, available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/04/disconcerting-details-how-facebook-teams-data-brokers-show-
you-targeted-ads (last accessed 7 January 2014). 
48 In case of Facebook, user targeting is achieved through a matching function which has been explained as 
follows: a company contacts a data broker with a particular audience in mind (e.g., people interested in losing 
weight). The data broker then generates a list of email addresses of people it believes that belong to that 
audience. It then creates a cryptographic hash function for each of the email addresses of each person on the 
list and sends these hash functions to Facebook. Facebook then compares this list of hash functions to its own 
list of hash functions of email addresses belonging all Facebook users and then identifies the relevant users as 
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Arrows (7), (10) and (11) intend to illustrate that data brokers may also obtain 
information about individual OSN users from trackers (e.g., browsing history), application 
providers (e.g., app usage) or third-party website operators (e.g., purchase history).  
 
2.6 (Third-Party) Website 
Earlier, we discussed how several OSNs allow third-party application providers to 
gain access to social networking data. The ability to interact with social networking data is 
not reserved to app providers alone, however. Most OSNs offer a range of tools to support 
interaction between third-party websites and OSN data. For example, OSNs such Facebook 
and MySpace allow third parties to leverage their authentication services, so that 
individuals can make use of their OSN credentials when accessing these websites (and 
therefore do not need to create a separate username and password).49 
‘Social plug-ins’ are another way in which third-party websites can interact with 
OSNs. A social plug-in is a website component designed to facilitate the sharing of third-
party content within OSNs. Facebook’s ‘like button’, for example, enables users to leave 
positive feedback for a web page and to share it with others.50 Similar tools are offered by 
other OSNs such as Google+ (‘+1’), Pinterest (‘Pin it’) and Linkedin (‘in share’).  
Embedding social plug-ins can help increase the visibility of a webpage. It also 
enriches the data exchanged within OSNs, so these tools are generally considered beneficial 
for both website operators and OSN providers. For OSN users, the presence of social plug-
ins offers convenience, as it enables them to share third-party content within their OSNs 
almost seamlessly.51 Nevertheless, the increased presence of social plug-ins on third-party 
websites has also engendered some controversy. Specifically, it has been demonstrated 
that many social plug-ins enable the OSN provider to monitor the browsing activities of its 
users beyond the context of the OSN.52 This tracking capability may exist even if the user 
                                                                                                                                                             
being part of the target group. (K. Opshal and R. Reitman, ‘The Disconcerting Details: How Facebook Teams 
Up With Data Brokers to Show You Targeted Ads’, l.c.). In case of targeting based on browsing activity, 
mapping OSN users with the intended audience is done through a process referred to as ‘cookie matching’. 
Even if data brokers do not directly share any data with Facebook other than the relevant hash functions, 
Facebook might still be able to glean information of the user based on what is being advertised (Id.). 
49 M.N. Ko, G.P. Cheek and M. Shebab, ‘Social-Networks Connect Services’, Computer 2010, Issue n° 8, IEEE 
Computer Society, p. 37. The Facebook platform (Facebook’s API) also allows third-party sites to obtain 
authorization tokes from Facebook. This basically works as follows: the user first authenticates herself using 
Facebook as their identity provider. Next, Facebook issues a token that allows the third-party site to access 
the user’s basic profile information. The third-party site can then request additional permissions, much in the 
same way as (other) application providers (Ibid, p. 38-39). See also supra; section 2.3. 
50 G. Kontaxis, M. Polychronakis, A.D. Keromytis and E.P. Markatos, ‘Privacy-Preserving Social Plugins’, 
Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium, 2012, p. 30, available at 
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final150.pdf (last accessed 8 
January 2014). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. See also A.P.C. Roosendaal, “We Are All Connected to Facebook … by Facebook!”, in S. Gutwirth et al. 
(eds), European Data Protection: In Good Health?, Springer, 2012, p. 3-19. An earlier version of this paper is 
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does not actually click on the plug-in at hand. It is sufficient that the plug-in has been 
embedded on the website in question.53 Moreover, the tracking capability offered by plug-
ins is not limited to OSN users. Even if an individual does not have an account with a 
particular OSN provider, the presence of its social plug-ins may allow it to uniquely identify 
this individual and to keep track of its visits to other pages in which the plug-in has been 
embedded.54  
The data flows between OSN providers and third-party websites are depicted in 
Figure 1 by two arrows (12):  the first is a solid bi-directional arrow which represents 
those flows which can be easily observed or inferred by OSN users. This is the case, for 
example, if an OSN user decides to use its OSN credential to log-in to a third-party website 
or to link third-party content to his or her profile. The second arrow is a dashed arrow 
which is meant to capture the leakage of browsing behavior through social-plug-ins.55 We 
have bracketed the term ‘third party’ to indicate that an OSN provider may also operate 
websites outside the OSN context (e.g., Google owns Youtube in addition to Google+). 
 
2.7 Other observers 
The previous sections have introduced some of the main players interacting with 
OSN-related data on a regular basis. An additional category of actors worth identifying is 
what we refer to as ‘other observers’. Other observers are entities who, regardless of 
                                                                                                                                                             
available on SSRN as A. Roosendaal, ‘Facebook tracks and traces everyone: Like this!’, Tilburg Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 03/2011, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1717563 (last accessed 8 January 2013). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. This happens much in the same way as third-party tracking: when a person visits a webpage in which a 
social plug-in is embedded, the user’s browser will also query the domain of the OSN (plug-in) provider. 
When queried the OSN (plug-in) provider will also send along a cookie which uniquely identifies the website 
visitor (and links it to the OSN user’s account if applicable). For more detailed information see M.N. Ko, G.P. 
Cheek and M. Shebab, ‘Social-Networks Connect Services’, l.c., p. 38-39 and A. Roosendaal, ‘Facebook tracks 
and traces everyone: Like this!’, l.c., p. 4-8. This issue was investigated by the Irish Data Protection authority 
in 2011, who considered that the collection of these data by Facebook shall be considered lawful as long as 
Facebook retained only the minimum information necessary for a limited period of time, and does not use 
these data for profiling purposes: see Data Protection Commissioner, ‘Report of Audit – Facebook Ireland 
Ltd.’, 21 December 2011, p. 81-86, available at 
http://dataprotection.ie/documents/facebook%20report/final%20report/report.pdf (last accessed 12 
February 2014). However, the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) has taken the position that website 
operators should only activate social plug-ins once the visitor of the website expresses his or her consent 
with regards to the placement of the corresponding cookies. See Commission nationale de l’informatique et 
des libertés (CNIL), Solutions pour les boutons sociaux, http://www.cnil.fr/vos-obligations/sites-web-cookies-
et-autres-traceurs/outils-et-codes-sources/les-boutons-sociaux/ (last accessed 3 December 2014). Tools 
such as « Social Share Privacy » enable website operators to de-active social plug-ins until the website visitor 
decides he or she wishes to make use of a particular plug-in.  For more information see 
http://panzi.github.io/SocialSharePrivacy/.  
55 Dashed arrow (12) is misleading - in a way similar to arrows (7) and (9) - to the extent that tracking occurs 
via the browser or operating system of the user (in which case they would coincide simply with arrow (4). We 
deliberately chose this way of visual representation to make clear that users can be tracked by OSN providers 
across websites who have embedded their social plug-ins.  
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whether or not they have a formal relationship with an OSN or its users, access data that is 
processed in the context of an OSN. Such access takes place regularly, and for a plethora 
reasons: market research, student oversight, law enforcement, intelligence gathering, 
credit risk assessment, employee background checks, disability verification etc. Online 
news outlets are brimming with reports of how schools, employers, intelligence agencies 
and other entities are using social media to monitor individuals’ activities.  
For example, school administrators are often cited as reviewing social networking 
data for inappropriate student behavior, such as underage drinking.56 Recently, a 
Californian high school even hired a firm to monitor public postings on social media to 
search for possible violence, drug use, bullying, truancy and suicidal threats.57  
Employers are also known to consult OSNs when evaluating job applicants; or to 
take disciplinary action towards employees (even firing) after learning about unwanted 
behavior through social media data.58  
Last, but definitely not least, recent revelations concerning intelligence operations 
have indicated that national security agencies also use social networking data to evaluate 
potential national security threats.59 
Arrow (13) represents the data flows which take place in situations where 
observers access OSN-related data. It is important to note that an observer may also access 
these data indirectly, e.g. via a data broker or tracker (arrows (14) and (15)).60 Finally, it is 
worth underlining that the observation of OSN data is not necessarily limited to data which 
                                                 
56 See e.g., Associated Press, ‘District to monitor students MySpace pages’, NBC news, 23 May 2006, available 
at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12937962/#.Us50c7R_tGM; N. Buczek, ‘Schools discipline students of 
Internet content’, 22 February 2006, http://thefire.org/index.php/article/6855.html (last accessed 9 January 
2014). 
57 M. Martinez, ‘California school district hires firm to monitor students' social media’, CNN, 18 September 
2013, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/14/us/california-schools-monitor-social-media (last 
accessed 8 January 2014). 
58 See e.g., C.A. Ciocchetti, ‘The eavesdropping employer: a twenty-first century framework for employee 
monitoring’, Future of Privacy Forum, 2010, p. 45 available at http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/The_Eavesdropping_Employer_%20A_Twenty-First_Century_Framework.pdf (last 
accessed 9 January 2013). According to a 2009 study by Proofpoint, an internet security firm, 8 percent of 
companies with one thousand employees or more have terminated at least one employee for comments 
posted on a social networking site. See A. Ostrow, ‘Facebook Fired: 8% of US Companies have Sacked Social 
Media Miscreants’, Mashable, 10 August 2009, available at http://mashable.com/2009/08/10/social-media-
misuse (last accessed 10 January 2013).  
59 See e.g., E. MacAskill, J. Borger, N. Hopkins, N. Davies and J. Ball, ‘GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret 
access to world's communications’, The Guardian, Friday 21 June 2013, available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa (last 
accessed 9 January 2013). 
60 For examples see K. Opshal and R. Reitman, ‘The Disconcerting Details: How Facebook Teams Up With Data 
Brokers to Show You Targeted Ads’, l.c. 
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has been labelled as ‘public’ according to the user’s privacy settings (e.g., in case of 
surreptitious eavesdropping or co-operation with law enforcement officials).61 
 
2.8 Infrastructure (Service) Provider 
A final category of actors which is worth mentioning are what we refer to as 
‘infrastructure (service) providers’. These are the entities that operate the technical 
infrastructure which is necessary for OSN providers to offer their services and for OSN 
users to make use of the OSN. are Examples include Internet Service Providers (‘ISPs’), 
hosting service providers, device manufactures, the providers of operating systems, etc. 
While we will not discuss the role of these entities with great detail, it is nevertheless 
worth noting their important role in enabling OSN interactions.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
61 See Facebook, ‘Global Government Requests Report’ for an aggregate overview of the data requests 
received by Facebook from government officials during the first 6 months of 2013, available at 
https://www.facebook.com/about/government_requests (last accessed 9 January 2013).  
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3. Legal framework 
Now that we have identified the main types of actors engaging with OSNs, we will 
proceed to analyze their legal status. It is impossible, within the context of a single 
deliverable, to provide an in-depth analysis for every single activity described in the 
previous chapter. Instead, our analysis will be focused on 3 central actors and 3 legal 
instruments. The actors we have chosen as focal points for our legal analysis in the context 
of the SPION project are the OSN provider, OSN users and third-party application 
providers.  The three legal instruments are: 
1. Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (the ‘Data 
Protection Directive’)62; 
2. Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (the ‘E-Privacy 
Directive’)63; and 
3. Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market64 (the ‘E-Commerce 
Directive’). 
The first two instruments were selected because they contain the main rights and 
obligations of OSN users, OSN providers and third party application developers in relation 
to the processing of personal data. The third instrument, the E-Commerce Directive, was 
selected because it contains important liability exemptions which may be held applicable to 
the providers of OSNs or related applications. Only the first two instruments will be 
analyzed in the context of this deliverable. The third instrument, the E-Commerce Directive, 
will be analyzed in SPION deliverable D6.3 (‘Liability and accountability of actors in social 
networking sites’). 
                                                 
62 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regards to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, Official Journal of the European Union, n° L 281, 23 November 1995, p. 31–
50. Hereafter also referred to as ‘Directive 95/46/EC’ or simply ‘the Directive’. 
63 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive 
on privacy and electronic communications), Official Journal L201, pp. 37-47 (31 July 2002). This Directive 
was amended in 2009 by the Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, (OJ L 
337, 18.12.2009). 
64 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive 
on electronic commerce), O.J. 17 July 2000, L 178/1-16. 
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Other important sources of rights and obligations are the terms and conditions and 
privacy notices of both OSNs and application providers, as well as well as the OSN terms 
and conditions for developers. Where appropriate, reference shall also be made to the role 
and impact of these instruments. 
 
3.1  Data protection 
a. Scope 
Ratione materiae 
Directive 95/46/EC applies to the processing of personal data.65 In order to assess 
its applicability vis-à-vis OSNs, one must first establish which types of data are involved. 
Schneier has developed a taxonomy of ‘social networking data’, which distinguishes among 
the following six categories of data66: 
1. Service data: data provided to an OSN provider in order to make use the OSN 
(e.g., legal name, age) 
2. Disclosed data: data that is posted by OSN users on their own profile pages (e.g., 
blog entry, picture, video) 
3. Entrusted data: data that is posted by OSN users on the profile pages of other 
OSN users (e.g., a wall post, comment) 
4. Incidental data: data about an OSN user which has been uploaded by another 
OSN user (e.g., a picture) 
5. Behavioral data: data regarding the activities of OSN users within the OSN (e.g., 
who they interact with and how) 
6. Derived data: data which is inferred from (other) OSN data (e.g., membership of 
group X implies attribute Y). 
 
Each of these social networking data will qualify as personal data insofar as they 
relate to an identified or identifiable individual.67 It is not required that the individual in 
question be identified by his or her full name. Even where individuals do not appear to be 
                                                 
65 Specifically, article 3(1) provides that Directive 95/46 shall apply ‘to the processing of personal data wholly 
or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which 
form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system’.  This essentially includes any 
automated operation performed upon personal data. Two areas are excluded by art. 3(2) of the Directive: 
processing of personal data (a)  in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law 
and (b) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.  
66 B. Schneier, ‘A Taxonomy of Social Networking Data’, Security & Privacy 2009, IEEE, Vol. 8, Issue 4, p. 88. 
While overlap among the identified categories is possible, the taxonomy is helpful  
67 According to the Article 29 Working Party, data relates to an individual ‘if it refers to the identity, 
characteristics or behavior of an individual, or if such information is used to determine or influence the way in 
which that person is treated or evaluated’ (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the 
concept of personal data’, WP 136, 20 June 2007, p. 10.) 
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easily identifiable (e.g., when an alias is used), they may be indirectly identifiable through 
(a combination of) other data, such as the personal attributes listed in their profile (e.g., 
age, residence, etc.), their list of friends, traffic data (e.g., IP-addresses) or cookie data. As a 
result, much of the data processed in the context of OSNs will qualify as ‘personal data’ in 
the meaning of Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
Ratione personae 
Once it has been established that a certain activity falls within the material scope of 
Directive 95/46, one must determine which entity (or entities) is (are) responsible for 
ensuring compliance. Directive 95/46 assigns the responsibility for compliance to the 
‘controller’, who is defined by article 2(d) as  
‘the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or 
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data […] (emphasis added)’ 
 
The definition of a ‘controller’ contains two main components. First, there is a 
reference to the exercise of a determinative influence (‘determines’), which is generally 
understood as an ‘exercise of decision-making power’.68 The second component of the 
definition refers to the object of the controller’s influence, namely the ‘purposes and means 
of the processing of personal data’. Commentators sometimes paraphrase art. 2(d) by saying 
that the controller is the entity deciding about the ‘why and how’ of the processing69: given 
a particular processing operation, the controller is the entity who has determined why the 
processing is taking place (i.e., ‘to what end’; or ‘what for’) and how this objective shall be 
reached (i.e., which means shall be employed to attain the objective). Classic examples 
include: an employer collecting data about job applicants as part of a recruitment process 
or a hospital using patient records for medical research purposes.70  
Another important actor recognized by Directive 95/46/EC is the ‘processor’.  A 
‘processor’ is defined as an entity who processes personal data on behalf of the data 
                                                 
68 The ability to influence the processing may stem from a variety of circumstances. See Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”’, WP169, 16 
February 2010, p. 10-12, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf (last accessed 22 May 
2013). See also B. Van Alsenoy, ‘Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and “everything in 
between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46’, Computer, Law & Security Review 2012, vol. 
28, p. 30. 
69 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 13. 
70 Directive 95/46 recognizes that the purposes and means of the processing might be determined by more 
than one entity. Article 2 (d) alludes to this possibility by stating that the controller may determine the 
purposes and means of the processing ‘alone or jointly with others’. An example of joint control is the scenario 
where a travel agency, a hotel chain and an airline decide to create a common reservation portal, whereby 
they jointly decide which data will be stored, how reservations will be allocated and confirmed, who can have 
access to the information stored, etc. (Opinion 1/2010 l.c., p. 22.) 
22 
 
controller (art. 2, (e)). This concept was introduced in light of the practice whereby one 
organization requests another organization to perform certain processing operations on its 
behalf. When an entity other than the controller (or its employee) carries out processing 
‘on behalf of’ a controller, this organization shall be deemed a ‘processor’ rather than a 
‘controller’. This distinction is quite important seeing as processors shall, as a rule, only be 
indirectly accountable for compliance with Directive 95/46/EC.71 
While the criteria set forth by articles 2(d) and (e) seem straight-forward in theory, 
their application in practice often is not. As the complexity of data processing increases, 
determining which entity - or entities - may be said to ‘control’ a particular processing 
operation can be quite challenging. This is especially the case when the data processing 
involves a range of different actors, who are each involved in the processing to a greater or 
lesser extent. Over the following sections, we will analyze to what extent OSN providers, 
OSN users and third-party application developers may be considered as ‘controllers’ within 
the meaning of article 2(d) of Directive 95/46.  
 
b. OSN provider 
OSN providers are generally considered to be ‘controllers’ within the meaning of 
Directive 95/46.72 After all, they determine both the purposes and means of their own 
processing activities: their purpose is to provide a social networking service which 
generates revenue. They also determine the means of their own processing activities: they 
decide about the nature of the social networking service and how it will be provided – from 
user registration until account deletion. In addition to those operations that are strictly 
necessary to provide the OSN service, the provider also decides about a range of additional 
processing activities; including those designed to support targeted advertising.73 
                                                 
71 B. Van Alsenoy, ‘Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and “everything in between”: the 
definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46’, l.c., p. 25 et seq. 
72 See e.g. College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, ‘Publicatie van Persoonsgegevens op het Internet’, CBP 
Richtsnoeren, December 2007, p. 7-8; ; B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 
2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?’, Identity in the Information Society (IDIS) 2009, p. 
70; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, WP 163, 12 June 
2009, p. 5; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of controller and 
processor’, l.c., p. 21; P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, Computer Law & Security 
Review 2010, Vol. 26, p. 537-538; E. Kosta, C. Kalloniatis, L. Mitrou and S. Gritzalis, ‘Data protection issues 
pertaining to social networking under EU law’, Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 2010, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 196; D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the Challenges 
Facing Social Networking’, International Law & Management Review 2010, Vol. 6, p. 131; B.J. Koops, 
‘Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical  Analysis of the “Right to be Forgotten” in Big Data 
Practice’, Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 08/2012, p. 10 and Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Social networking and online forums – when does the DPA apply?’, 24 May 
2013, Version 1.0, p. 10-11. 
73 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 70. 
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While most would agree that OSN providers should be considered as ‘controllers’, 
opinions vary as to the scope of their control. In certain cases, it is relatively clear whether 
or not an OSN provider acts is acting as a controller. For instance, few would dispute that 
an OSN provider acts as a controller in relation to: 
• the collection of explicitly solicited data (e.g., information which OSN users are 
asked to provide when registering to the site, such as their name, age and place of 
residence) (cf. ‘service data’); 
• their processing of user data for purposes of targeted advertising (e.g., analysis of 
‘behavioral data’); and 
• their processing of user data designed to enhance the quality of the OSN service 
(e.g., use of facial recognition techniques to create ‘tag suggests’74). 
 
For other processing operations, however, the issue of whether or not an OSN 
provider is acting as a controller is less clear-cut. A particular contentious matter is 
whether or not an OSN provider should be considered as a (co-)controller in relation to 
content shared (spontaneously) by its users. For example, should an OSN provider be 
considered a ‘controller’ of the processing that takes place when its users share content 
with one and other (e.g., the sharing of a photograph among friends)? There are essentially 
four ways of approaching this issue. 
First, several authors argue that web 2.0 service providers, such as OSN providers, 
should not be considered as controllers in relation to user-generated content at all.75 After 
all, these entities exercise little or no control at the moment content is being uploaded. 
Moreover, requiring OSN providers to assume such control would have undesirable 
consequences, most notably for the freedom of expression of OSN users.76 From this 
perspective, one could argue that only the OSN user who decides to upload certain content 
should be considered as a controller vis-à-vis this sharing activity.77  
                                                 
74 See e.g. S. Curtis, ‘Facebook defends using profile pictures for facial recognition’ The Telegraph, 15 
November 2013, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/10452867/Facebook-
defends-using-profile-pictures-for-facial-recognition.html.  
75 See e.g. G. Sartor, ‘Providers’ liabilities in the new EU Data Protection Regulation: A threat to Internet 
freedoms?’, International Data Privacy Law 2013, Vol. 3, No. 1,  p. 9-10. 
76 Ibid, p. 10. 
77 Certain authors have also argued that the OSN provider should instead be considered as a ‘processor’, 
which is defined by art. 2(e) as ‘a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller’. (see e.g. P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social 
Networks’, l.c., p. 537-538). This interpretation is at odds with 17(3) of Directive 95/46/EC, which implies a 
willingness, on the part of the processor, to only process personal data in accordance with the instructions 
issued by the controller. Moreover, this provision stipulates that this willingness must be expressed in the 
form of a legally binding instrument. Given that many OSN providers, in practice, reserve themselves the 
ability to modify the nature of their services at all times, often without prior consultation of their users, we 
would argue that they should not be considered as ‘processors’, but rather as separate controllers (whose 
‘control’ extends to different aspects of the processing). 
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Other commentators argue that OSN providers should be considered as controllers 
in addition to OSN users. Specifically, they argue that the OSN provider should be 
considered a controller in relation to its social networking service ‘as a whole’.78 Once data 
have been uploaded, the OSN provider proceeds to perform operations upon them which 
enable the actual sharing of information (e.g., storage, analysis79, dissemination, access 
control). And for these processing activities, the provider has determined the ‘purposes 
and the means’ in advance, independently of the OSN users.80 Because the sharing of 
personal data among contacts is an essential component of its service, these commentators 
conclude that the OSN provider acts as a (co-)controller vis-à-vis the dissemination of 
content over its platform (even though the initiative to share this content originated from 
one of its users).81  
A third approach, which combines elements of the previous two approaches, views 
both OSN users and OSN providers as controllers, but each ‘for different combinations of 
data flows and purposes’.82 In other words, both entities might act as controllers, but each 
for different aspects of the processing. They each exercise control, but ‘at different stages’ 
and ‘to different degrees’.83 While this approach allows for greater nuance and flexibility, 
its practical implications aren’t always clear.  
Finally, a fourth approach (which could also be viewed as an extension of the third 
approach) considers that the OSN provider may only be considered a ‘controller’ of 
personal data shared over its platform once it has obtained actual knowledge of its 
existence. Under this approach, it is the OSN user who shares the content which is seen as 
the ‘primary’ controller, while the OSN provider would only become a (secondary) 
controller once it has been notified of specific personal data processing.84 
                                                 
78 See B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, Identity in the Information Society (IDIS) 2009, p. 70. 
79 For example, algorithmic analysis carried out by the OSN provider may determine the degree of visibility 
given to a particular content item. In case of Facebook’s ‘Newsfeed’, for instance, Facebook deploys an 
automated selection mechanism to establish relevancy of content posted by friends, which ultimately 
determines the degree of visibility a particular item receives. (see T. Bucher, ‘Want to be on top? Algorithmic 
power and the threat of invisibility on Facebook’, New Media Society 2012, Vol. 14, p. 1167 et seq. 
80 See B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 71. 
81 While this approach involves an expansive interpretation of the controller concept, these authors anticipate 
certain limitations as to the corresponding responsibilities and liabilities of OSN providers. For example, the 
indicate that OSN providers might be able to escape liability if they can demonstrate having continuously 
undertaken all reasonable measures to prevent the data protection violation from taking place, and to limit 
their effects once they have been manifested (see B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks 
and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 71.) 
82 Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, l.c., p. 537-538. 
83 Based on Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 22. See also B. Van Alsenoy, ‘Allocating responsibility among controllers, 
processors, and “everything in between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46’, l.c., p 32 et seq. 
84 This was essentially the reasoning of the Italian Supreme Court in its recent judgment concerning the 
Google Video case, see Corte di Cassazione, sez. III Penale, sentenza 17 dicembre 2013 – deposit ail 3 febbraio 
2014, sentenza n. 5107/14,  at paragraph 7.2 (‘[…] as long as the offense is unknown to the service provider , it 
cannot be regarded as the controller of the processing, because it lacks any decision-making power on the data 
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c. OSN Users 
The users of an OSN may, in certain circumstances, also be considered as 
‘controllers’ within the meaning of article 2(d), namely when processing data relating to 
other individuals.85 In order to be qualified as a ‘controller’, the user must exercise 
decision-making power with regards to both the purposes and means of the processing 
operation (cf. supra). Generally speaking, the purposes for which OSNs are used vary 
according to two main parameters (1) the type of OSN, its technical features and its 
intended audience; and (2) whether the user is an individual or an organization. Private 
individuals typically use OSNs for purposes of social interaction, self-expression, career 
development, self-education, etc. Organizations, on the other hand, typically engage in OSN 
usage to further their organizational mission or corporate objectives (e.g., product 
promotion, membership recruitment, event planning).86 In both cases, however, the OSN 
user can in fact freely determine why it processes personal data relating to others in the 
context of the OSN. 
As to determining the technical means of the processing, OSN users generally do not 
have any real decision-making power. While they may have the ability to adapt some minor 
features or settings, they do not have any real power of negotiation as to the manner in 
which the processing is conducted. They either take it or leave it. But every OSN user does, 
as a rule, exercise the choice as to whether or not he wishes to share a particular piece of 
information and how to do so. In this sense OSN users still effectively determines the 
‘means’ of their processing when entrusting data about others to an OSN.87  
The control exercised by OSN users in principle extends to any content they choose 
to provide and any processing operations they undertake of their own accord (i.e., without 
                                                                                                                                                             
itself, and when, instead, the provider is aware of the illegal data and is not active for its immediate removal or 
makes it inaccessible, however, it takes a full qualification of the data controller’) (unofficial translation based 
on Google translate). The full text of this opinion is available at 
http://www.dirittoegiustizia.it/allegati/15/0000063913/Corte_di_Cassazione_sez_III_Penale_sentenza_n_51
07_14_depositata_il_3_febbraio.html (last accessed 13 February 2014). 
85 An individual cannot act as a controller towards his or her own data. The regulatory scheme of Directive 
95/46/EC is predicated on the notion that the data controller is an entity other than the data subject him- or 
herself. An individual person might act as a controller of personal data relating to others, but not of his or her 
own personal data. Accepting that the data subject could act as a controller of the processing of his own 
personal data would have rather absurd implications: the data subject would have to obtain consent from 
him- or herself, provide him- or herself with notice, etc. 
86 See also Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Social networking and online forums – when does the 
DPA apply?’, l.c., p. 4 
87 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 70. One must, however, be careful not to exaggerate the decision-making 
power of the individual user. The controllership of the user does not extend to the SNS as a whole, but only to 
those processing operations for which he can actually determine the purposes and means.  
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solicitation).88 For example, a company which uses an OSN for purposes of product 
promotion shall be considered a controller towards: 
- any personal data that is included on the company’s profile page (including its 
list of ‘connections’ or ‘friends’); 
- any personal data which the company collects through the OSN (e.g., personal 
attributes of its connections); 
- any information about individuals which the company disseminates through the 
OSN.89 
For private individuals, the issue is less clear cut. The second indent of art. 3(2) 
provides that Directive 95/46 shall not apply to the processing of personal data ‘by a 
natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity’. This exemption gives 
rise to the following question: to what extent can OSN usage be considered a ‘purely 
personal or household activity’? 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has provided further guidance regarding article 
3(2), namely in the context of the Lindqvist case.90 Here, the ECJ considered that the 
exception for personal use must  
 ‘be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of 
private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of 
personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made 
accessible to an indefinite number of people’.91 
 
The Court thus put forward two elements to determine whether the personal use 
exception can be applied. In the first place the processing activity must be carried out ‘in 
the course of private and family life’. Secondly, the exception shall not apply where the data 
is published on the Internet and made accessible to an indefinite number of people.92 The 
                                                 
88 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 70. 
89 See also Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Social networking and online forums – when does the 
DPA apply?’, l.c., p. 3. 
90 European Court of Justice , C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, 6 November 2003,  available at 
http://curia.europa.eu. The facts of this case were as follows: Mrs. Lindqvist, who worked as a catechist in a 
local parish, had set up a number of web pages to provide information to fellow parishioners preparing for 
their confirmation. These pages also included information about several of her colleagues in the parish, who 
were referenced either by their full names or merely by their first names. In many cases telephone numbers 
were listed. The pages also described, ‘in a mildly humorous manner’ the jobs held by these colleagues and 
their hobbies. Other information was also mentioned, such as family circumstances; and of one colleague it 
was stated that she had injured her foot and was working half-time for medical reasons. Mrs. Lindqvist had 
not obtained the consent of the individuals referenced on her web pages, nor informed them of the fact that 
she was mentioning personal information about them. She also hadn’t notified the data protection authority. 
She was subsequently prosecuted for violation of the Swedish law on personal data. 
91  European Court of Justice , Bodil Lindqvist, at paragraph 47 (emphasis added). 
92 The Belgian Privacy Commission, in a recommendation regarding the sharing of pictures by individuals, 
also touched upon the question of personal use. It considered that where images are processed for the sole 
purpose of distribution among a select (‘definable’) group of friends, family members or acquaintances, such 
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first criterion suggests that private OSN users, who make use of an OSN for purposes of 
social interaction, should in principle be able to avail themselves of the personal use 
exemption. After all, social interaction is an essential component of one’s private or family 
life.93 However, one must not lose track of the second element in the reasoning of the ECJ, 
namely that the exception shall not apply where the data is made accessible to an indefinite 
number of people. This implies that OSN users might not be able to invoke this exception 
once the data in question passes a certain threshold of accessibility.94 
In its Opinion on social networking, the Article 29 Working Party indicated that the 
processing activities of private OSN users are generally covered by the personal use 
exception.95 However, it also identified two situations in which the personal use exception 
will not apply. First, the exception will not apply if the individual is acting ‘on behalf of a 
company or association, or uses the [OSN] mainly as a platform to advance commercial, 
political or charitable goals.’96 Second, the exception for personal use also will not apply if 
the individual ‘takes an informed decision to extend access beyond self-selected “friends”’.97 
In conclusion, one can state that OSN users may be considered as ‘controllers’ within 
the meaning of article 2(d). Organizations and companies shall in principle be subject to the 
same set of responsibilities as those incumbent upon controllers in any other context. In 
case of private individuals, the applicability of Directive 95/46/EC depends on whether or 
not the OSN usage falls within the remit of the personal use exemption. The implications of 
this outcome will be discussed infra; section 4.3.a. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
processing could fall under the exception of personal use. As examples it mentioned the transmission of 
pictures via email to the participants of a family event, or the posting of such pictures on a secured website, 
which is only accessible to the relevant family members; and which is protected against indexing by search 
engines. (Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer, ‘Aanbeveling uit eigen beweging 
inzake de verspreiding van beeldmateriaal’ Aanbeveling nr. 02/2007, 28 november 2007, p. 21-22, available 
at  www.privacycommision.be The Dutch Data Protection Authority adopted an almost identical approach 
shortly thereafter in its Guidance Report relating to the publication of personal data on the internet (See 
College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, ‘Publicatie van Persoonsgegevens op het Internet’, CBP Richtsnoeren, 
December 2007, p. 12–13).  
93 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 74. 
94 See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of 
Amateur Data Controllers’, Computer Law Review International (Cri) 2010, Vol. 4, p. 103. 
95 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 5. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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d. Application providers 
Third-party application providers will typically also be considered as ‘controllers’ 
within the meaning of article 2(d).98 Similar to OSN providers, the objective of most 
application providers is to provide a service which generates revenue. 99 The nature of this 
service will depend on the intended functionality of their application(s): gaming, content 
streaming, location sharing, crowd funding … .100 In this sense, they determine the purposes 
of the processing of user data that takes place when they provide their services. Application 
providers also determine the means of their processing: they decide which data to collect 
regarding OSN users and how these data will be subsequently processed. In addition to 
deciding about those activities which are necessary to deliver the app’s functionality, the 
provider may also decide about additional processing activities; including those designed 
to enable targeted advertising. 
When collecting data related to OSN users, application providers are not entirely 
free in deciding how this collection shall be organized. As indicated before, many 
application providers obtain access to OSN data by soliciting permissions from OSN users.  
Once these permissions have been granted, the application provider will query the social 
network’s Application Programming Interface (API) to make use the delegated privileges 
(e.g., access profile information, post to wall).101 Using the API of an OSN is generally 
subject to a number of terms and conditions, which are stipulated by the OSN provider. As a 
result, application providers are in principle bound by the limitations and restrictions 
imposed by the API terms when soliciting, collecting and processing OSN data.102  
                                                 
98 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 5.See also P. 
Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, l.c., p. 540-541.  
99 As in the case of OSNs, many application providers derive (a portion of) their revenue from targeted 
advertising (so-called ‘in-app advertising’). Application providers may also charge money for the downloads 
of their apps, for in-app purchases or for premium subscriptions. For an overview of the different revenue 
models of mobile apps see OECD, ‘The App Economy’, l.c., p. 22-26. 
100 Cf. supra; section 2.3. 
101 W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, ‘Security and Privacy of Online Social Network 
Applications’, l.c., p. 208. See also M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, ‘AppInspect – Large-
scale Evaluation of Social Apps’, l.c., p. 1-2. A number of OSN providers, which include Google, Myspace and 
Yahoo united their efforts to develop a uniform social application programming interface, which is called 
‘OpenSocial’. The goal of this initiative is to allow application developers to offer their applications to users 
from various OSNs and to enable their functionality across OSNs. See W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and 
F. Piessens, ‘Security and Privacy of Online Social Network Applications’, l.c., p. 210. See also F. Le Borgne-
Bachschmidt et al., ‘User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society’, Final Report, 
2008, p. 243, available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/helberger/User_created_content.pdf (last accessed 
28 January 2014). 
102 For more information regarding Terms & Conditions of OSN APIs see A. Kuczerawy, ‘Legal and ethical 
analysis’, Exploiting Social Networks for Building the Future Internet of Services (SocIoS),  Deliverable D3.5, p. 
21-29. While third-party application providers are bound by API terms, they in principle decide 
autonomously whether they wish to collect certain data via an OSN and how to use it. Although they too must 
‘take it or leave it’, they exercise a choice when deciding to collect data about individuals through an OSN API. 
In this sense application providers still effectively determine the ‘means’ of their processing when collecting 
data about OSN users in this way. 
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The access rights of application providers may vary across platforms. In case of 
Facebook, for example, application providers are granted access to the user’s ‘basic 
information’ by default.103 This information includes user ID, name, picture, gender, locale 
and friend connections.104 Additionally, application developers may also request access to  
several additional permission classes (e.g., ‘email permissions’, ‘extended profile 
properties’, ‘extended permissions’, etc.).105 These permissions may, for example, enable 
the application provider to post information on behalf of users or to access private 
messages.106 Other OSN platforms support different access control models; which may be 
either more granular or more coarse-grained.107 
The control exercised by application providers in principle extends to any 
processing which takes place to support the application’s functionality. It also extends to 
any processing undertaken by the application provider to enable targeted advertising (e.g., 
disclosure of a user’s location to support contextual advertising).108 Depending on the 
nature of the application, the application provider might also enable users to share content 
with others. If this is the case, the provider is likely to face uncertainties similar to those of 
OSN providers regarding their obligations vis-à-vis user-generated content (see also infra; 
section 4.3.b). 
 
e. Other entities 
In the previous section, we identified a range of additional actors interacting with 
OSN data, such as trackers, data brokers and other observers. Each of these entities will 
typically also be considered as ‘controllers’ in their own right, at least insofar as they 
pursue their own purposes in processing these data. In cases where they do not determine 
their own purposes, or have limited control over the means used, they may be considered 
as ‘processors’ rather than ‘controllers’.109 
                                                 
103 M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, ‘AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social Apps’, 
l.c., p. 3. See also https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-other (last accessed 27 January 
2014). 
104 Id.  
105 Id. See also https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/permissions (last accessed 27 January 
2014). 
106 Id. 
107 See also W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, ‘Security and Privacy of Online Social 
Network Applications’, l.c., p. 212-213. For example, ‘OpenSocial’ currently supports only one specific 
permission: allow or deny the application to access all of the user’s data. However, implementers can always 
enhance this model in their own implementations. (Id.) 
108 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, WP202, 
27 February 2013, p. 12available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf (last accessed 28 January 2014). 
109 For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between controllers and processors see Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”’, WP 169, 16 
February 2010. See also B. Van Alsenoy, ‘Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and 
“everything in between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46’, l.c., p. 30-33. 
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For example, a third-party tracker will in principle be considered a ‘controller’ for 
its collection and analysis of data related to the web browsing behavior of OSN users. 
However, it will only be considered a controller as long as it determines its own purposes 
and means of the processing. As indicated earlier, trackers often work on behalf of an ad 
network.110 If a tracker is working on behalf of an ad network, and only processes personal 
data in accordance with the instructions issued by the ad network provider, the tracker will 
be considered a ‘processor’ rather than a controller. Another scenario in which a tracker 
might be considered a ‘processor’ is the scenario in which the tracker processes data on 
behalf of the OSN provider (e.g., if the OSN provider hires a tracker to learn more about 
how its users navigate the OSN).111 
Data brokers generally act as controllers in their own right. They determine their 
own purposes when collecting data about individuals (e.g., collect data for purposes of 
profiling or predictive scoring). They also decide autonomously about how to organize this 
collection (e.g., which sources to consult, which technical methods to employ). While the 
product developed by a data broker will (eventually) be consumed by a third party, the 
data broker will have typically concluded its product development long before it is offered 
to clients.112  
Other ‘observers’ of OSN data in principle also collect these data for their own 
purposes. For example, an employer who accesses the profile of a job applicant is likely to 
do so in order to assess the fitness of the candidate. Similarly, the intelligence agency 
mining OSN data in order to detect a potential threat to national security is likewise 
pursuing its own (statutory) objectives. In certain instances, observers may rely on the 
assistance of other entities to help achieve its objectives (e.g., a school may hire a private 
firm to monitor social network usage of its students). In these cases, the extent to which the 
service provider will be considered a ‘processor’ or a ‘(co-)controller’ will depend largely 
on (1) how the service provider has defined the purpose(s) of its services up front and (2) 
the extent to which the service provider acts in accordance with the instructions issued by 
its customers.113 
 
 
                                                 
110 Cf. supra; section 2.4 
111 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, l.c., p. 13 
(indicating that a third party provides analytics services for an application owner, without processing the 
data for its own purposes or sharing it across developers, it is likely to be acting as a processor). 
112 The third party using the brokers service will typically also be a controller in its own right, separately from 
the data broker. 
113 See also B. Van Alsenoy, ‘Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and “everything in 
between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46’, l.c., p. 36-37 
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3.2 E-Privacy 
The second legal instrument relevant to OSNs is Directive 2002/58/EC, commonly 
referred to as the ‘E-Privacy Directive’.114 The E-Privacy Directive compliments the general 
rules of data protection provided by Directive 95/46/EC with specific rules for the 
processing of personal data in the context of electronic communications.115 In addition, the 
E-Privacy Directive also contains several rules of general applicability, e.g. with regard to 
the use of location data or the storage of information on the devices of end-users.  
 
a. Scope 
According to article 3, the E-Privacy Directive applies to  
 
‘the processing of personal data in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services in public communications networks in the EU, 
including public communications networks supporting data collection and 
identification devices’.  
 
The provisions of the E-Privacy are therefore in principle aimed at the providers of 
(publicly available) electronic communications services. However, several provisions have 
been drafted in such a way that their scope is not limited to such providers, but may also 
apply to other actors.116 Over the following subsections, we will briefly elaborate upon 
those provisions which are of particular relevance in the context of OSNs. 
 
b. Electronic communications services  
The E-privacy Directive does not contain a formal definition of an ‘electronic 
communications service’. This term is defined by Directive 2002/21/EC (the Framework 
Directive’), which defines an electronic communications service as 
‘a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the 
conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, including 
                                                 
114 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive 
on privacy and electronic communications), Official Journal L201, pp. 37-47 (31 July 2002). This Directive 
was amended in 2009 by the Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, (OJ L 
337, 18.12.2009). 
115 See recitals (10) et seq. 
116 E. Kosta, Unravelling consent in European data protection legislation – a prospective study on consent in 
electronic communications, Doctoral Thesis, K.U.Leuven, Facutly of Law, 1 June 2011, p. 304. 
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telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for 
broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control over, 
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it does 
not include information society services […] which do not consist wholly or mainly in 
the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks’.117 
 
 The concept of an ‘electronic communication service’ is intended to be technology-
neutral.118 It includes traditional telecommunications services such as fixed and mobile 
telephony, but also includes internet access services, such as (public) Wi-Fi hotspots.119  
When considering the actors identified in section 2, it would appear as if the E-
Privacy Directive is mainly relevant for ‘infrastructure service providers’. Services offered 
by other entities, such as those offered by application providers or OSN providers, will 
generally not be considered as ‘electronic communications services’.120 While many of 
these services involve some form of electronic communication, they often do not consist 
‘wholly or mainly’ in the conveyance of signals on an electronic communications 
network.121 As a result, they shall in principle not be considered as providers of an 
‘electronic communications service’. There is, however, one notable exception to this rule, 
namely for the offering of electronic mail services. 
 Most OSN providers offer an e-mail service. According to the Article 29 Working 
Party, these electronic mail services may be considered as ‘electronic communications 
services’ within the meaning of Directive 2002/58/EC.122 The Article 29 Working Party has 
therefore held that OSN providers who offer a publicly accessible email service will be 
                                                 
117 Article 2(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (‘Framework 
Directive’), O.J. L-108, 24 April 2002, p. 33 (emphasis added). 
118 E. Kosta, Unravelling consent in European data protection legislation – a prospective study on consent in 
electronic communications, o.c., p. 218-219. 
119 For more information on the concept of an ‘electronic communications service’ see also Article 29 Working 
Party, ‘Working Document Privacy on the Internet - An integrated EU Approach to On-line Data Protection’, 
WP 37, 21 November 2000, p. 26, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2000/wp37_en.pdf and E. Kosta, Unravelling consent in 
European data protection legislation – a prospective study on consent in electronic communications, o.c., p. 217 
et seq.  
120 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 10. 
121 For a lucid explanation of the distinction between ‘electronic communications services’ and 
communications services which otherwise make use of electronic communications networks (such as certain 
VoIP services) see: Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications (RTR-GmbH), 
‘Guidelines for VoIP Service Providers - Consultation Document’, April 2005, p. 5, available at 
https://www.rtr.at/de/komp/KonsultationVoIP2005/VoIP_Guidelines_2005_Cons.pdf (last accessed 30 
January 2014). See also D. Stevens, P. Valcke and E. Lievens, ‘“Voice over IP”: law challenged by technology’, 
16th European Regional Conference, International Telecommunications Society, September 2005; 
http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~jmueller/its/conf/porto05/pages/papers.htm (last accessed 30 January 
2014).  
122 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 10. 
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subject to the provisions of the E-Privacy Directive with regards to this specific service (but 
not for their other services).123 
 
c. Confidentiality of communications and devices 
 One of the objectives of the E-Privacy Directive is to ensure confidentiality of 
communications. Article 5 provides that the interception or surveillance of electronic 
communications shall be prohibited, unless (a) the users concerned have consented or (b) 
there exists an explicit legal authorization (article 5(1)).124 Article 5 also aims to protect the 
confidentiality of the ‘terminal equipment’ of end-users.125 To this end, article 5(3) 
provides that 
 ‘Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the gaining of access to 
information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only 
allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her 
consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in 
accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing.’ 
 The scope of article 5 is not limited to the providers of electronic communications 
services or public communications networks. It contains rules of general application, which 
restricts (a) any interception or surveillance of electronic communications (article 5(1)), as 
well as (b) any storage of (or subsequent access to) information on the terminal equipment 
of end-users (article 5(3)). 
 Article 5(3) is sometimes referred to as the “cookie rule”. The current version of this 
provision entails that individuals must in principle provide prior consent before the 
placement of (or subsequent access to) cookies on their computer.126 There are two 
(narrow) exceptions to this rule, namely where the storage or access is (a) carried out for 
the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic 
communications network, or (b) is strictly necessary in order for the provider of an 
                                                 
123 Id.  
124 This legal authorization must have been adopted in accordance with article 15(1). Article 15(1) refers to 
legislative measures necessary to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, and 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the 
electronic communication system. 
125 The terminal equipment of an end-user is essentially any equipment used to receive an electronic 
communications service (e.g., computer, phone, tablet). 
126 The previous version of this provision was slightly less stringent, stating that the use of cookies was only 
allowed when the user was informed about it, in a clear and comprehensive way, in accordance with the 
95/46/EC Directive, and was offered the right to object to such processing by the data controller. (E. Kosta, 
Unravelling consent in European data protection legislation – a prospective study on consent in electronic 
communications, o.c., p. 239 et seq.) See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on 
online behavioural advertising’, l.c., p. 13. 
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information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the 
service.127 
 Although article 5(3) appears to have been aimed primarily at the use of cookies, 
this provision applies to any storage of (or subsequent access to) information on the 
terminal equipment of end-users. As a result, this provision also applies to applications 
which run on mobile devices, as well as any other application which gains access to data 
contained on an end-user’s device.128 The rules of article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive 
shall therefore be relevant to most OSN providers, website operators, application providers 
and trackers.  
 
d. Use of location data 
Location-based services are services whose main functionality depends on the 
processing of location data.129 Location data are defined by article 2(c) of the E-Privacy 
Directive defined as  
‘any data processed in an electronic communications network or by an electronic 
communications service, indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment 
of a user of a publicly available electronic communications service’.  
 
In digital mobile networks, location data are often processed to enable the 
transmission of communications. However, such data may also be useful in providing 
additional functionalities, such as location-based direct marketing. They may also enable 
interesting applications in the context of OSNs (e.g., a friend proximity service, sharing of 
location tracked through GPS).  
The E-Privacy Directive in principle only regulates location-based services offered 
by the providers of electronic communications services or public communications 
networks.130 According to the Article 29 Working Party, it does not regulate the use of 
location data by other service providers (so-called ‘information society service 
providers’)131, such as OSN providers or application providers. However, as location data 
                                                 
127 The former exception can be seen as authorizing the use of mere “session cookies”. The latter exception 
concerns storage or access which is strictly necessary to provide a service that has been explicitly requested 
by the individual concerned. (E. Kosta, Unravelling consent in European data protection legislation – a 
prospective study on consent in electronic communications, o.c., p. 251). 
128 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, l.c., p. 7 
(stating that article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive applies to ‘every entity that places or reads information 
from smart devices’). 
129 See E. Kosta, o.c., 264. 
130 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart 
mobile devices’, WP185, 16 May 2011,  p. 8-9, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp185_en.pdf (last access 31 January 
2014). 
131 Id. The term ‘information society service provider’ is not defined by Directive 2000/58, but rather by 
article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as ‘any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by 
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are generally also considered ‘personal data’ within the meaning of Directive 95/46/EC, 
these entities will still be bound by the requirements contained in the latter instrument 
when offering location-based services.132  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services’”. Information society services 
excluded from the scope of the E-Privacy Directive by virtue of article, unless their service consists wholly or 
mainly in the conveyance of electronic signals over public communications networks.   
132 Ibid, p. 9. 
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4. Rights and obligations 
In the previous section, we analyzed the legal position of OSN providers, OSN users 
and application providers under both Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC. The 
purpose of this section is to detail the main rights and obligations of these entities in light 
of their respective roles. Rather than providing an exhaustive account of every requirement 
or restriction, we will limit ourselves to a discussion of the most pertinent rights and 
obligations of each entity. 
 
4.1 OSN provider 
a. Duty to inform 
As controllers, OSN providers are obliged to provide individuals with certain 
information regarding the processing of their personal data (articles 10-11).133 As a rule, 
each data subject must be informed of at least (1) the identity of the controller (and, if 
applicable, of his representative) and (2) the purposes of the processing.134 In addition, 
controllers may be required to provide the data subject with supplemental information ‘in 
so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances 
in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject’.135 
Such additional information can refer to (1) the categories of data concerned, the recipients 
or categories of recipients of the data, information with regard to the existence of the right 
of access, the right to rectify inaccurate data, etc.136 According to Article 29 Working party, 
an OSN provider should at a minimum (also) inform its users about137: 
                                                 
133 At the outset, these provisions make a distinction between two scenarios: one in which the information is 
obtained directly from the data subject (art. 10), and one in which the information is collected indirectly (i.e. 
from an entity other than the data subject) (art. 11). The notice obligations of the controller in each scenario 
are largely similar; the main differences concern (a) the moment by which notice must be provided and (b) 
the exemptions to the notice obligation.  
134 The use of plural “purposes”, in Articles 10-11, implies that the data subject has to be informed not only 
about the main purpose to be accomplished, but also about any secondary purposes for which the data will be 
used. See also D. Korff, ‘Comparative study on different approaches to new privacy challenges, in particular in 
the light of technological developments: Country Study A.4 – Germany’ (2010), p. 33, available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_country_re
port_A4_germany.pdf (last accessed on 23 March 2011), commenting on the relevant provision of the German 
Data Protection Act, which uses the term “purposes” as well.  
135 Art. 10-11, 1(c) (emphasis added).   
136 Member State laws vary considerably with regard to the kinds of information which must actually be 
provided in order to ensure fairness of processing. Sometimes the examples given in the are repeated, other 
times somewhat different examples are included, and sometimes there are no examples at all. (see Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provisions’, WP100, 25 November 
2004, p. 3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp100_en.pdf (last 
accessed 30 June 2012). 
137 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 7. 
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- the usage of their data for advertising purposes (e.g., the use of profile 
information for purposes of targeting advertisements); 
- any sharing of their data with third parties (e.g., third-party application 
providers); 
- any profiling to which the users might be subject, including an identification of 
the main data sources (e.g., personal details submitted during registration, 
cookies, purchase records); and 
- any usage of any sensitive data. 
 
The Working Party also recommends that OSN providers: 
- provide users with adequate warnings about the privacy risks related to 
themselves and to others when they upload information to the OSN; 
- remind users that uploading information about other individuals might impinge 
upon their privacy and data protection rights; and 
- advise users that they should in principle only upload pictures or information 
about others with the consent of the individuals concerned.138 
 
OSN providers processing location data of its users are obliged to mention this 
explicitly.139 They must also inform their users of any cookies that they place which are not 
strictly necessary to provide the service.140 Finally, as publishers of third-party 
advertisements, OSNs must ensure that their users are informed of the fact that use of their 
services may result in monitoring by trackers, in particular by ad network providers or 
other ad serving entities (who might place a third-party cookie when serving an add).141 
In principle, the OSN provider may provide the necessary information via a so-called 
‘privacy notice’, provided that the information contained in this notice is sufficiently 
comprehensive and presented in an understandable way.142 However, for certain types of 
information or actions, it may be recommended to present information (again) at the 
moment of a specific action. For example, an OSN provider can help increase audience 
awareness by showing its users (a subset of) the people who will have access to the content 
which the user is planning to share.143 
                                                 
138 Id. See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications 
of Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 106-107. 
139 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile 
devices’, WP185, 16 May 2011,  l.c.,  p. 13-14. 
140 Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive. 
141 For more information see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioral 
advertising’, l.c., p. 17-19 and 24. See also supra; section 2.4.  
142 See also P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, l.c., p. 545. For more information 
regarding the role of privacy notices, as well as a number of practical guidelines for the implementation of 
such notices, we refer the reader to SPION D6.1 (‘Legal requirements for privacy-friendly model privacy 
policies’) and D9.3.5 (‘Privacy-friendly ‘model’ privacy policies’), available at www.spion.me. 
143 See e.g. Y. Wang, P.G. Leon, K. Scott, X. Chenz, A. Acquisti, L.F. Cranor, ‘Privacy Nudges for Social Media: 
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b. Legitimacy of processing 
Under Directive 95/46/EC, processing of personal data may only take place to the 
extent that there is a ‘legitimate ground’ justifying the processing. The legitimate grounds 
recognized by the Directive are enumerated (exhaustively) in article 7. Of these grounds, 
there are three grounds in particular which the provider of an OSN might invoke, namely: 
- the unambiguous consent by the data subject (art. 7(a)); 
- a necessity for the performance of a contract (art. 7(b)); and 
- an (overriding) legitimate interest (art. 7(f)). 
 
 For processing that is strictly necessary to provide the OSN service (e.g., initial 
creation of profile, offering of basic functionalities), the provider can in principle rely on 
the ground of ‘necessity for the performance of a contract’.144 For a limited number of 
operations, the provider may also be able to rely on the ‘legitimate interest’ ground (e.g., 
processing for purposes of ensuring system security).145 For all other processing 
operations, such as the use of users’ personal data for targeting purposes, the provider will 
in principle have to obtain the  ‘unambiguous consent’ of its users.146 
There are situations in which data subject consent is mandated by law, even though 
the controller might theoretically be able to invoke another ground to legitimate the 
processing. For instance, article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive entails that the provider of 
an Online Social Network must obtain the consent of its users prior to: 
- the installation of any software on the device of an end-user (e.g., when offering a 
mobile application for the OSN); 
- any placement of cookies which are not strictly necessary to provide service (e.g., 
to monitor web-browsing activities outside the OSN).147 
 
As far as the use of OSN data for purposes of targeted advertising is concerned, the 
situation is somewhat less clear-cut. Directive 95/46/EC does not formally require that 
individuals express their consent before their data is used for purposes of direct marketing 
or targeted advertising.148 As a result, one might argue that the use of profile information of 
                                                                                                                                                             
An Exploratory Facebook Study’, PSOSM 2013, available at 
http://precog.iiitd.edu.in/events/psosm2013/9psosm6-wang.pdf (last accessed 1 February 2013). 
144 P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, l.c., p. 542.  
145 Id. 
146 For a more detailed analysis on the role of consent as a basis for legitimating the processing of personal 
data see section 2.2 of SPION deliverable D6.1 (‘Legal requirements for privacy-friendly model privacy 
policies’) and D9.3.5 (‘Privacy-friendly ‘model’ privacy policies’), available at www.spion.me. 
147 Cf. supra; section 3.2.c. 
148 In principle, it is sufficient that individuals are given a right to object in accordance with article 14(b). (See 
also E. Kosta, o.c., p. 164 et seq.) Directive 2002/58/EC does require prior consent of individuals when certain 
data or techniques are used for purposes of ‘direct marketing’. Specifically, explicit prior consent shall be 
necessary where the marketing activity involves either (1) use of cookies (article 5(3)); or (2) the use of 
‘automated calling and communication systems without human intervention’, ‘facsimile machines’ or 
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OSN users (e.g., name, age, location, etc.) for purposes of targeted advertising does not 
necessitate consent. However, even in absence of a legal provision mandating consent, a 
normal reading of article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC de facto also requires users’ consent in 
order to legitimate these types of processing activities. The same arguably applies for any 
processing of data intending to locate the geographic position of the end-user, regardless of 
whether it involves any storage of information on the device of the end-user.149 
 
c. Privacy settings 
Every controller is under a duty to ensure the security and confidentiality of its 
personal data processing (articles 16-17 Directive 95/46/EC).  Specifically, every controller 
is obliged to  
‘implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal 
data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, 
unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the 
transmission of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of 
processing.’150 
 
Applying notions of security and confidentiality in the context of OSNs may seem 
counter-intuitive at first. After all, OSNs are about sharing data rather than about keeping 
secrets. Nevertheless, OSN providers are obliged take reasonable steps to prevent 
‘unauthorized access’ as well as ‘any other forms of unlawful processing’.   
In practice, accessibility of an OSN profile is determined, to greater or lesser extent, 
by the ‘privacy settings’ associated with that profile.151 These settings enable individuals to 
exercise a certain degree of control as to who may access their OSN data. Many users wish 
to limit their disclosure of personal information to people they know, or perhaps even to a 
subset of their contacts. Other users may want to share information with the public at 
large. This raises the issue of what the default settings should be on OSNs. According to the 
Article 29 Working Party, the OSN provider should offer default settings 
‘which allow users to freely and specifically consent to any access to their profile's 
content that is beyond their self-selected contacts in order to reduce the risk of 
unlawful processing by third parties’.152 
                                                                                                                                                             
electronic mail (article 13(1)). Use of ‘pop-up windows’ or ‘banners’ on the side of a webpage arguably does 
not (in and of itself) bring an advertising activity within the remit of article 13(1). (See also E. Kosta, o.c., p. 
299-300.) However, where the advertisements are targeted to individual users by means of data collected via 
cookies, article 5(3) of the Privacy Directive takes full effect. 
149 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart 
mobile devices’, WP185, 16 May 2011,  l.c. p. 14) 
150 Article 17(1) Directive 95/46/EC (emphasis added). 
151 For a comprehensive discussion of privacy settings see J. Ausloos, ‘Guidelines for privacy-friendly default 
settings’, SPION D6.4, 2012, available at www.spion.me. 
152 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 7. 
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 In other words, access to the profile information of OSN users should be restricted 
to self-selected contacts (e.g., ‘friends’, ‘network members’) by default. OSN users should be 
asked for permission before access is extended to any other entity.153 For example, 
information contained in a user’s profile should not be made available for indexation by 
(internal or external) search engines unless the user has explicitly agreed to this.154 By 
restricting access to self-selected contacts by default, OSN providers may also solidify the 
legitimacy and fairness of their processing activities (as users need to take affirmative 
action before these data are made available to other third parties).155  
 
d. Data accuracy 
Article 6(1)d of Directive 95/46/EC provides that ‘all personal data should be 
accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’. In first instance, this provision requires 
controllers to put in place mechanisms and procedures that enable them to establish an 
appropriate level of accuracy. As is the case for the other controller obligations, the precise 
scope of this duty must be interpreted within reason. For example, the standard of care for 
ensuring data accuracy will be higher in a medical setting than in the context of OSNs.156 
While this seems straightforward as a matter of principle, it still leaves open the following 
question: which measures are providers of OSNs obliged to adopt in order promote 
accuracy of data uploaded by their users?  
In this regard, it is worth taking note of recent guidance issued by the UK 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO): 
‘[In] a situation where the vast majority of the site content is posted directly by third 
parties, the volume of third party posts is significant, site content is not moderated in 
advance and the site relies upon users complying with user policies and reporting 
problems to the site operator, we would not consider that taking ‘reasonable steps’ 
requires the operator to check every individual post for accuracy.’157  
                                                 
153 This includes access to personal data by application providers, including when this application has not 
been downloaded by the OSN user herself, but rather by one of her contacts.  
154 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 7. 
155 See also SPION 6.4, p. 30 et seq. Similar reasoning regarding the controller’s duty to ensure the 
confidentiality and security of processing can also be found in the opinions of the Article 29 Working Party 
regarding applications for smart devices and location-based services. See in particular Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, l.c., p. 11 and 15 and Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile devices’, l.c., p. 13-14. 
156 See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, ‘Search Engines after 'Google Spain': 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?’, ICRI Working Paper 15/2013, September 2013, p. 36, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2321494. 
157 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Social networking and online forums – when does the DPA 
apply?’, l.c., paragraph 37 (emphasis added). The ICO did indicate that it might hold otherwise in situations 
where data controller plays a more active role in selecting, allowing or otherwise moderating content. (Ibid, 
paragraphs 35-36) 
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In these situations, the ICO continued, it would be sufficient for the OSN provider to  
- have a clear and prominent policy for its users about acceptable and non-
acceptable posts; 
- have clear and easy to find procedures in place for data subjects to dispute the 
accuracy of posts and ask for them to be removed; and 
- respond to disputes about accuracy quickly, and have procedures to remove (or 
suspend access to) content, at least until such time as the dispute has been 
settled.158  
 
e. Access by third-party apps 
OSN providers play a central role in mediating access to the personal data of OSN 
users. In addition to controlling access by fellow OSN users, they also control access by 
third-party applications. As explained earlier, many OSNs currently enable access to OSN 
data by means of an Application Programming Interface (API).159  
Third-party application providers are in principle ‘separate’ controllers: they 
determine their own purposes and means for their processing of personal data. Once 
access has been granted, an application provider will typically collect the data and export 
them to its own servers for further processing.160 As a result, application providers are 
subject to their own data protection obligations, which exist independently of those 
incumbent on the OSN provider. The OSN provider, however, still acts as a controller in 
relation to its own processing activities, including any disclosure to third parties. This 
means that the OSN provider is obligated to take reasonable steps to ensure that these data 
are not disclosed to unauthorized entities.161  
An interesting question to consider is whether OSN providers are under a duty to 
ensure that data is only being shared with ‘reliable’ entities.162 OSNs generally tend to 
dissociate themselves from application providers, who they consider as ‘third parties’.163 
They typically disclaim any and all responsibility for actions undertaken by these third 
parties.164 Nevertheless, one could argue that OSN providers have a basic duty of care to 
                                                 
158 Ibid, paragraph 38. 
159 Cf. supra; section 2.3. 
160 These servers are outside of the OSN domain, meaning they are beyond the OSN provider’s direct control 
or supervision. (M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, ‘AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of 
Social Apps’, l.c., p. 2.) 
161 Cf. supra; section 4.1.c. 
162 F. Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., ‘User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society’, 
l.c., p. 243-244. 
163 P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, l.c., p. p. 541. 
164 See also F. Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., ‘User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information 
Society’, l.c., p. 243-244 and E. Denham (Assistant Privacy Commissioner of Canada), ‘Report of Findings into 
the complaint filed by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) against Facebook Inc. 
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establish that the recipients of the data under their control are in fact trustworthy (i.e. 
likely to process it in a lawful manner).165 Opponents will argue that this interpretation is 
excessive, and that it is sufficient for the OSN provider to assume responsibility for its own 
operations (i.e., the boundaries of its control establish the boundaries of its obligations).  
In practice, OSN providers require application providers to stipulate which 
permissions they need. When an OSN user wants to make use of (or download) a particular 
application, he or she will be notified of which permissions are being requested by the 
application provider.166 Even under a narrow construction of the OSN provider’s 
responsibilities, the OSN provider is still obliged to  
- provide for a level of granularity that enables selective access and disclosure of 
personal data related to OSN users167; 
- ensure that application providers do not obtain access to more data than has 
been authorized by users; and to 
- take reasonable measures to ensure that meaningful consent is obtained from 
their users168; and 
- deploy appropriate measures to detect apparent misuse by application providers 
(e.g., complaint handling mechanisms, use of basic malware detection tools)169. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the duties of OSN providers in relation to third party 
apps may also depend on how these apps are presented to users. In 2008, Facebook 
introduced a “verified apps” program, to which application developers could apply on a 
                                                                                                                                                             
under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2009, paragraphs 166 et seq. 
available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.pdf  
165 F. Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., ‘User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society’, 
l.c., p. 244 . These authors argue that such an obligation can be derived from article 6(1) of Directive 95/46, 
which requires that personal data must be processed ‘fairly and lawfully’. They draw further support for this 
proposition through a comparison with article 17(2) of the Directive, which provides for a duty of care when 
choosing a processor who will process personal data on behalf of a controller (Id.) An alternative way of 
phrasing this argument would be to say that the OSN provider acts as a ‘custodian’ (or ‘steward’) of data 
entrusted by its users, who as a result has a certain duty of care before releasing data to third parties. 
166 Cf. supra; section; 2.3. 
167 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 8-9. See 
also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, l.c., p. 11. Here 
the reasoning is essentially that OSN providers have a duty to ensure that application providers have at least 
the ability to comply with provisions of Directive (in other words, to prevent ‘unlawful forms of processing’). 
Granular access capabilities are considered necessary so that apps are capable of collecting no more 
information than is necessary to realize the purposes of their processing in accordance with article 6, 1(c). 
168 See also E. Denham, ‘Report of Findings - CIPPIC v. Facebook Inc.’, l.c., p. 3 and D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, 
R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the Challenges Facing Social Networking’, l.c., p. 137. For 
example, the OSN provider could require its application providers to use a standardized privacy notice. The 
OSN provider can also do its own part by ensuring that the requested permissions and (references to) privacy 
notices are displayed in a prominent way.  
169 These issues were also investigated by the Irish Data Protection authority in its 2011 audit of Facebook: 
see Data Protection Commissioner, ‘Report of Audit – Facebook Ireland Ltd.’, l.c., p. 87-97. See also Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, l.c., p. 20-21.  
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voluntary basis. If approved, the application would receive a “Facebook-verified badge” as 
well as increased distribution.170 Facebook also implied that verified applications were 
‘secure, respectful and transparent’.171 In 2012, the US Federal Trade Commission issued a 
complaint alleging that Facebook in fact did not take any steps to verify the security 
practices of a Verified Application provider (‘beyond such steps as it may have taken 
regarding any other application’).172 This complaint eventually resulted in a decision which 
ordered that Facebook refrain from misrepresenting ‘the steps it takes or has taken to 
verify the privacy  or security protections that any third party provides’.173 
 
f. Data subject rights 
In addition to imposing obligations upon controllers, Directive 95/46 also provides 
data subjects with certain rights. Specifically, each individual whose personal data are 
being processed have a right to 
a) obtain certain information with regards to the processing of his or her personal 
data (right of access) (article 12(a)); 
b) object to the processing of their personal data, save where otherwise provided 
by national legislation (right to object) (article 14); and 
c) obtain, as appropriate, the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the 
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of the Directive, (right 
to rectification, erasure or blocking) (article 12(b)). 
 
As a controller, the provider of an OSN must accommodate the exercise of data 
subject rights. In principle, this duty extends to any personal data it has collected. As 
indicated earlier, however, many data shared on OSNs are not actively solicited by the OSN 
provider, but instead shared spontaneously by its users. An interesting question to 
consider therefore is whether OSN providers are also obliged to accommodate the exercise 
of data subject rights in relation to such content. We shall return to this question later on in 
this deliverable (cf. infra; section 4.3.b).  
 
 
                                                 
170 E. Denham, ‘Report of Findings - CIPPIC v. Facebook Inc.’, l.c., p. 43. 
171 United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), In the matter of Facebook Inc. - Complaint, Docket No. C-
4365, 2012, p. 15,  available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookcmpt.pdf (last accessed 
4 February 2014). 
172 Id. 
173 United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), In the matter of Facebook Inc. – Decision and Order, Docket 
No. C-4365, 2012, p. 4,  available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf (last accessed 4 
February 2014). 
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4.2 Application providers (and other entities) 
There is considerable similarity among the obligations incumbent upon OSN 
providers and those incumbent upon application providers. In principle, the latter will be 
considered controllers in their own right (cf. supra), which implies that they are essentially 
subject to the same obligations as OSN providers. As a result, application providers are 
obliged to ensure: 
a) transparency of processing; 
b) legitimacy of processing;  
c) respect for data quality principles (e.g. accuracy, proportionality, finality); 
d) confidentiality and security of processing; and 
e) accommodation of data subject rights. 
 
a. Duty to inform  
Application providers are obliged to provide their users with information specified 
in articles 10-11 of the Data Protection Directive. Prior to offering its service, the 
application provider must specify: 
- its identity and contact information; 
- the precise categories of personal data (OSN and other) it will collect; 
- for which specific purposes;  
- how users may exercise their rights.174 
This information should be displayed prominently prior to usage of the application 
and remain easily accessible afterwards.175  
 
b. Legitimacy 
Similar to OSN providers, there are essentially three grounds available to 
application providers to legitimate their processing of personal data, namely: 
- the unambiguous consent by the data subject (art. 7(a)); 
- a necessity for the performance of a contract (art. 7(b)); and 
- an (overriding) legitimate interest (art. 7(f)).176 
 
Unambiguous consent of the user shall in principle be necessary for 
                                                 
174 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, l.c., p. 22. 
For applications installed on smart devices, the Working Party has also recommended that users be informed 
of the retention periods of their data as well as security measures applied by the controller (Ibid, p. 23). 
175 Id. 
176 See also p543 Van Eecke Truyens and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps 
on smart devices’, l.c., p. 14-16. 
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- the installation of any software on the device of an end-user (e.g., when offering 
a mobile application for the OSN); 
- any placement of cookies which are not strictly necessary to provide service 
(e.g., to monitor web-browsing activities outside the application environment); 
- any use of OSN or other personal data for purpose of targeted advertising; and 
- any processing of data intending to locate the geographic position of the end-
user.177 
 
As explained earlier, obtaining the informed consent of OSN users shall in principle 
be a shared responsibility among application providers and OSN providers (at least where 
access to OSN data is concerned). The application provider must clearly articulate which 
permissions it requires and for which purposes, while the OSN provider will de facto be 
responsible for communicating this information to its users and obtaining their 
authorizations. 
 
c. Data quality principles 
As controllers, application providers are also obliged to respect the principles of 
data quality, which include inter alia the principle of purpose specification and data 
minimization (article 6). These principles require that no more data is collected than is 
necessary to achieve the purposes of the processing. In practice, many application 
providers request (access to) more data than are necessary to deliver the app’s 
functionality. These data are then used for a variety of (other) purposes, e.g. to facilitate 
targeted advertising.  In principle, application providers may collect and use such 
additional data on the condition that they provide their users with clear information and 
obtain their consent before doing so. However, the retention and use of such data should be 
limited in time, taking into account the need to ensure a fair balance between the business 
interests of application providers and the privacy interests of their users.  
 
d. Confidentiality and security 
Application providers are obliged to ensure the security and confidentiality of the 
personal data which they process (articles 16-17). In practice, many application providers 
will export (a subset of) the data they collect from OSN providers to their own servers for 
further processing.178 In its Opinion on apps for smart devices, the Article 29 Working 
Party highlighted a number of security considerations for app developers, including: 
- measures to protect data both in transit and at rest; 
                                                 
177 Cf. supra; section 4.1.b. 
178 These servers are outside of the OSN domain, meaning they are beyond the OSN provider’s direct control 
or supervision. (M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, ‘AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of 
Social Apps’, l.c., p. 2.) 
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- measures to prevent ‘buffer overflow’ or ‘injection’ attacks; 
- use of low entropy app-specific or temporary device identifiers; 
- use of secure identification and authentication mechanisms.179 
 
e. Data subject rights 
App users must be given the ability to exercise their rights as data subjects provided 
by articles 12 and 14. Application providers should inform their users about how they can 
exercise these rights, preferably by means of a secure online access tool.180 Application 
users should also be provided the ability to withdraw their consent at any time.181 Given 
their role in facilitating access to OSN data, OSN providers may also be expected to offer 
tools which allow OSN users to discontinue access to their profile data (unless such access 
is already limited by default, e.g., to moments at which the application is being used by the 
OSN users).  
 
 
4.3 OSN Users  
a. As ‘controllers’ 
In section 2, we analyzed the extent to which a user of an OSN may be considered as 
a ‘controller’ within the meaning of article 2(d). There we concluded that every OSN user, 
at least in theory, acts as a ‘controller’ when processing data related to other individuals. 
This implies that OSN users shall in principle be subject to the same requirements and 
obligations as other controllers, unless they can avail themselves from one of the 
exemptions recognized by Directive 95/46/EC.  
In its Opinion on social networking, the Working Party considered that the 
processing activities of private OSN users will generally be covered by the personal use 
exemption.182 Since then, several commentators have contested this view; arguing that in 
practice there are many situations in which the exemption is inapplicable.183 First, it 
appears to be common ground that the exemption does not apply in situations where data 
                                                 
179 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’, l.c., p. 18-20. 
180 Ibid, p. 24. 
181 Ibid, p. 25. 
182 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 5. 
183 See e.g. P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, l.c., p. 540; N. Helberger and J. Van 
Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 
101 et seq. and D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the Challenges Facing 
Social Networking’, l.c., p. 147 et seq. Even before Opinion 5/2009, several authors considered it likely that a 
substantial number of OSN users might not be able to benefit from the personal use exemption. See e.g. R. 
Wong, ‘Social Networking: Anybody is a Data Controller!’, (last revised) 2008, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271668 and B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. 
Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 75. 
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are made accessible to ‘an indefinite number of people’.184 As a result, OSN users with 
‘public’ profiles will almost certainly fall outside the scope of article 3(2). Even if a profile is 
set to ‘private’, however, it is quite possible that the information is still de facto accessible 
to an ‘indefinite’ number of people (e.g., due to access by ‘friends-of-friends’).185 Second, a 
substantial share of individuals does not only (or not exclusively) use OSNs for personal 
purposes, but also for professional networking or for political, commercial or charitable 
ends.186 Given that the exemption of article 3(2) only applies to ‘purely’ personal or 
household activities, those users would find themselves outside its protective remit.  
In cases where the personal use exemption cannot be applied, the OSN user in 
question shall in principle be subject to the same requirements as those incumbent upon 
controllers in any other context.187 This outcome is warranted where organizations are 
concerned, who make use of OSNs to realize their commercial, political or other objectives. 
This outcome is more problematic, however, where private individuals are concerned. If an 
OSN user is subject to data protection law, it implies, inter alia, that this OSN user is 
required to ensure: 
- the legitimacy of processing (e.g., by asking for consent before posting data 
relating to others); 
- transparency of processing (e.g., by notifying the individuals concerned of the 
fact that information about them is now included on an OSN profile); 
- respect for the data quality principles such as fairness, proportionality, finality 
and accuracy (e.g., by refraining from posting erroneous statements); 
                                                 
184 Cf. supra; section 3.1.c.  
185 Previous research has indicated that many users set a relatively low threshold for deciding whether to 
accept someone as a ‘friend’ (See e.g. R. Gross and A. Acquisti, ‘Information Revelation and Privacy in Online 
Social Networks’, in Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES’05), 
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5, available at 
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bad-judgment/ (last accessed 10 February). Finally, regarding the “blurry-edged” nature of social networks 
see also L. Gelman, ‘Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks’, Boston College Law Review 
2009, vol. 50, in particular at p. 1326 et seq.   
186 N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur 
Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 103. 
187 Cf. supra; section 3.1.c.  
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- that data subjects have the ability to exercise his rights towards the processing 
(i.e. right of access, rectification, erasure or blocking); 
- the confidentiality and security of processing (e.g., by restricting access to 
individuals from the same community); 
- that, where required, notification to national supervisory authorities is 
performed. 
 
At first glance, it seems as if a number of these requirements could be applied to 
private individuals in a reasonable way. For example, many of us would agree that ‘friends’ 
should refrain from uploading pictures of one and other before checking whether it’s ok.188 
Or that they shouldn’t post inaccurate or harmful statements about others, regardless of 
whether or not their profile is set to ‘private’. For other data protection requirements, 
however, there appears to be a clear mismatch between legal provisions and OSN practices. 
For example, how does one interpret the requirement of not keeping personal data in 
identifiable form for longer than is necessary (art. 6(1)e) in relation to OSN users? Is it 
possible to determine a reasonable time-span as to how long a user should be allowed to 
maintain a picture or remark relating to another person on his profile page? Should we be 
requiring individuals to make such a determination? Another problematic provision is the 
controller’s duty to inform.189 Should OSN users be required to formally notify their peers 
of (1) their identities; (2) the purposes of the processing of their personal data as well as 
(3) the (categories of) recipients concerned? Or is it sufficient if these things are 
understood implicitly, as a result of prevailing social norms and common OSN practices?  
It is also worth noting that there are a number of controller obligations with which 
the OSN user cannot comply without co-operation of the OSN provider. Let us assume, for 
instance, that a data subject exercises his or her right to erasure towards a profile owner. 
Arguably, the latter would (more often than not) be under an obligation to remove this 
information immediately. However, what happens when the OSN provider retains these 
data for a longer period of time, in accordance with the terms and conditions of its service? 
As indicated earlier, individual OSN users have limited powers of negotiation in relation to 
the terms specified by the OSN provider.190  
The mismatch between data protection requirements and OSN practices has led 
several authors to advocate for a pragmatic approach.191 Rather than rigid adherence to the 
provisions of the Directive 95/46/EC, they argue, OSN providers and OSN users should 
                                                 
188 See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of 
Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 104. Others may find it perfectly acceptable (and even enjoyable) to find 
themselves ‘tagged’ unexpectedly in a picture uploaded by a shared contact.  
189 See also D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the Challenges Facing 
Social Networking’, l.c., p. 132. 
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191 N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur 
Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 105 et seq.  
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share the burdens of compliance in light of their respective roles. The implementation of 
this approach corresponds, by and large, to the recommendations issued by the Article 29 
Working Party in its Opinion on online social networks (cf. supra). For example, the 
Working Party already recommended that OSN providers make users aware of the privacy 
risks involved in uploading information related to others, and that they should obtain their 
consent before doing so. The use of privacy-friendly default settings may similarly be 
viewed as an example of a technical measure that supports users when they exercise their 
responsibilities as controllers.192 While this pragmatic approach seems reasonable (and 
perhaps even commendable) as a matter of practice, one also can’t help but wonder 
whether the framework of Directive 95/46/EC is being stretched beyond its intended 
domain of application.  
 
b. As ‘data subjects’ 
Private individuals are generally thought of as ‘data subjects’ rather than 
‘controllers’.193 Data subjects are the intended beneficiaries of data protection laws: it is 
their interests which these laws aim to protect by imposing requirements and limitations 
upon the processing of personal data. Directive 95/46/EC endows data subjects with 
certain rights, which they may invoke in case these requirements or limitations are not 
respected. For purposes of our current analysis, the most relevant rights are the data 
subject’s right to erasure (art. 12) and the right to object (art. 14).  
Article 12(b) stipulates that data subjects have the right to obtain, as appropriate, 
the ‘rectification, erasure or blocking’ of data in case where the processing of which does 
not comply with the provisions of the Directive. Rectification shall be particularly 
appropriate in instances where the data being processed is found to be inaccurate. Deletion 
or blocking may be appropriate where data have been obtained unlawfully or there is no 
longer a legitimate need to maintain the data.194  
Article 14(a) provides data subjects with a right to object to the processing of their 
personal data, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. It is important to 
note, however, that the data subject must in principle provide ‘compelling legitimate 
grounds relating to his particular situation’ when exercising the right to object.195 Where 
                                                 
192 See N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of 
Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 107. 
193 Opinion 5/2009, l.c., p. 5. A data subject, pursuant to article 2(a) of the Directive, is essentially any 
individual whose personal data are being processed, provided he or she is sufficiently identifiable. 
194 In instances where the data subject’s request for amendment, deletion or blocking is granted, she may also 
request that controller provides notification thereof to any third parties to whom the data have been 
disclosed. The only grounds for the controller to refuse such a request would be to assert that such 
notification is impossible or involves a disproportionate effort (art. 12, c). 
195 When personal data is processed for direct marketing purposes, the subject does not have to motivate 
his/her request. 
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the objection is justified, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve 
those data.   
Both the right to object and the right to erasure are intended to give individuals a 
certain amount of control over what happens to their data. In principle, these rights are to 
be exercised vis-à-vis the ‘controller’ of the processing. The previous sections have made 
clear that the OSN context involves a multitude of actors, who may each be in ‘control’ of 
different (aspects of different) processing operations. In principle, each entity is only 
responsible for those aspects under its own control, i.e. for which it determines the 
‘purposes and means’ of the processing. An interesting question to consider is whether OSN 
providers are obliged to accommodate the exercise of data subject rights in relation to 
content shared spontaneously by its users.196 For example, should an individual have a 
right to ask an OSN provider to take down a photograph posted by one of its users? While 
the initiative to share this content lies with the OSN user in question (who may therefore be 
considered as the ‘primary’ controller), most regulators seem to agree that OSN providers 
should put in place a mechanism to enable individuals to exercise their data subject rights 
directly towards the OSN provider.197 For example, in its Opinion on online social 
networks, the Article 29 Working Party considered that  
“Access and rectification rights of users are not limited to the users of the service but 
to any natural person whose data are processed. Members and non-members of SNS 
must have a means to exercise their right of access, correction and deletion. The 
homepage of SNS sites should clearly refer to the existence of a “complaint handling 
office” set up by the SNS provider to deal with data protection and privacy issues and 
complaints by both members and non-members.”198 
 
Although it is not stated explicitly as such, the quoted text suggests that OSN 
providers have a duty to accommodate data subject rights in relation to any personal data 
they process. This would imply that individuals can also exercise their rights as data 
subjects in relation to content shared by OSN users, seeing as these data are also processed 
by the OSN provider. This interpretation is also in line with guidance issued by national 
                                                 
196 See also supra; section 3.1.b. 
197 As indicated earlier, there a number of scholars who have argued that OSN providers (or the providers of 
similar services) should not be considered as ‘controllers’ in relation to the content shared via their 
platforms. As a result, these authors question the duty of these platform providers to accommodate data 
subject rights vis-à-vis user-generated content. Van Eecke and Truyens, for example, argue that an OSN 
provider should be considered as a mere processor in relation to content shared by users. In their view, only 
users should responsible for accommodating data subject rights. See P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy 
and social networks’, l.c., p. 539 and p. 543.  
198 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 11 (emphasis added). 
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regulators, such as the Dutch Data Protection Authority199 and the UK Information 
Commissioner’s  Office200.201  
While the guidance issued by the Working Party is most welcome, it refrains from 
offering any additional guidance as to how OSN providers should actually deal with these 
complaints. Should they remove any content upon request? Should they notify the OSN 
user from whom the content originated? Should the latter be able to contest the data 
subject’s complaint? We will discuss the potential negative implications of the lack of clear 
guidance in this respect in a forthcoming deliverable (SPION D9.6.3). 
 
  
5. Conclusion 
Online social networks have come to involve a myriad of actors. While users and 
providers of OSNs remain the ‘key players’, several other entities have become involved as 
well. Many application providers, for instance, offer their services through OSN platforms. 
Third-party website operators may leverage the authentication services of an OSN or 
embed its social plug-ins. Other entities engaging with OSNs include third party trackers, 
data brokers and other observers. 
The EU data protection framework was enacted before the emergence of OSNs. For 
the most part, scholars and regulators have been able to reconcile this framework with new 
social networking realities. But there are also instances in which this framework is 
beginning to show its limits. Two areas in particular require further consideration, namely 
(1) the role of OSN users as ‘controllers’ and (2) the exercise of data subject rights towards 
user-generated content.  
OSN users actively process personal data about themselves and others. However, 
the mere fact that an individual may also ‘control’ certain processing activities is not 
necessarily a sufficient justification to subject him or her to the same regime as 
organizations. Further research is necessary to determine how the appropriate balance 
between private individuals should be achieved.  
A second area of concern is the exercise of data subject rights in relation to user-
generated content. EU regulators agree that OSN providers should put in place a ‘complaint 
handling mechanism’ which allows individuals to exercise their rights as data subjects.  The 
consensus also seems to be that individuals should be able to, if necessary, exercise these 
rights in relation to content shared by users. Without appropriate safeguards, however, 
there is a risk of undue interference with OSN users’ freedom of expression. How these 
risks can be mitigated will be discussed in future deliverable (SPION D9.6.4). 
                                                 
199 College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, ‘Publicatie van Persoonsgegevens op het Internet’, l.c., p. 42. 
200 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Social networking and online forums – when does the DPA 
apply?’, l.c., p. 14. 
201 See also R. Wong, R. Wong, ‘Social networking: a conceptual analysis of a data controller’, Communications 
Law 2009, Vol. 14, No. 5, p. 148. 
